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I. INTRODUCTION 
To borrow a nicely turned phrase from the Supreme Court, "If 
there is any [ other] fixed star in our constitutional constellation,,,1 
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW. 
* Professor, Michigan State University of Law. 
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
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it is the Court's dedicated use over the past seventy years of the 
presumption-of-constitutionality doctrine for judicial review. 
Under this standard of review, the great majority of government 
actions operate under a heavy presumption of validity and are 
almost always upheld, subject onli to a challenger showing the 
action is unreasonable or arbitrary. Only in the exceptional case, 
where the government action affects a previously Court-identified 
liberty interest or suspect classification, will the presumption be 
reversed to impose the initial burden on the government to justify 
its action. 
There are persuasive arguments that this is the correct 
approach, as it reflects a proper deference to the elected branches 
of government in a democratic society. It is the very nature of 
democracy to allow the people who will be affected by particular 
policies to have a voice in the enactment of those policies; and of 
the republican form of democracy to allow representatives, 
accountable to the people, to enact those policies. It is a valid 
question why a court, composed of unelected officials not directly 
accountable to the people (in federal courts, at least), should be 
allowed to nullify the actions of a voting majority. As Michael 
McConnell says, "the people through their representative 
institutions-not the courts-have authority to decide which 
course of action 'does most credit to the nation.' . . . It is the right, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein."). 
2. Another phrasing of the standard is: The action will be upheld so long as 
the government had a "rational basis" for the action. The presumption-of-
constitutionality standard has been applied in an extremely deferential manner, 
where the government action is upheld as long as the government could 
conceivably have had, but did not actually have, a rational basis for the action. 
See. e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230 (1984) (stating that 
the statute will be upheld so long as it is "rationally related to a conceivable 
[government] purpose" (emphasis added»; Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 
483, 487-88 (1955) ("[I]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of a [policy] .... [So long as] the legislature 
might have concluded [the policy was necessary, it will be upheld] .... 'For 
protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not 
to the courts. '" (quoting Muon v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876». 
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privilege, and obligation of the people to deliberate about such 
questions through their elected representatives.,,3 
Alexander Bickel describes the task of devising the proper scope 
of judicial review as a "search ... for a [judicial] function which 
differs from the legislative and executive functions; . . . whose 
discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other 
departments' performance by denuding them of the dignity and 
burden of their own responsibility.,,4 James Bradley Thayer's 
1893 formula suggests courts generally should let stand the 
decisions of democratically elected legislatures and strike down 
only irrational laws: 
[The court] can only disregard the [challenged] Act when 
those who have the right to make laws have not merely 
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,-so clear 
that it is not open to rational question. That is the standard 
of duty to which the courts bring legislative Acts; that is the 
test which they apply,-not merely their own judgment as 
to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what 
judgment is permissible to another department which the 
constitution has charged with the duty of making it. This 
rule recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex, 
ever unfolding exigencies of government, much which will 
seem unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may 
reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution 
often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a 
range of choice and judgment; that in such cases the 
constitution does not impose upon the legislature anyone 
3. Michael McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A 
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 
FORDHAM L. REv. 1269, 1273-74 (1997). 
4. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-24 (2d 
ed., Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962) (coining the phrase "counter-majoritarian 
difficulty" for the problem of unelected judges replacing the values of the 
elected legislature with those of their own). See also generally JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4-5, 72 (1980) 
(developing the "representation-reinforcing" theory that legislation should 
generally be presumed constitutional and upheld so long as the democratic 
process is open and fair, but may be struck down when it has resulted from a 
defective or malfunctioning democratic process). 
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specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice; and 
that whatever choice is rational is constitutional. 5 
Thayer's views on judicial review have been enormously 
influential,6 providing foundations for the judicial philosophies of 
a number of prominent twentieth century jurists, including Justices 
Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Judge Learned Hand. 7 Judge 
Hand famously said, "For myself it would be most irksome to be 
ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to 
choose them, which I assuredly do not,,;8 and that "[c]ourts 'should 
not have the last word in those basic conflicts of "right and 
wrong,'" even in cases involving Bill of Rights guarantees. Such 
5. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 144-50 (1893). 
6. See generally Symposium, One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The 
Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1993) (discussing the 
influence of Thayer's 1893 article); Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights 
in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635, 
680-82, nn.ll 0, III (2003). 
7. Describing Thayer as "our great master of constitutional law" Justice 
Frankfurter commented, 
[Thayer] influenced Holmes, Brandeis, the Hands (Learned and 
Augustus) ... and so forth. I am of the view that if! were to name one 
piece of writing on American Constitutional Law-a silly test maybe-
I would pick an essay by James Bradley Thayer in the Harvard Law 
Review, consisting of 26 pages, published in October, 1893, called 
"The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law" .... Why would I do that? Because from my point of view it's a 
great guide for judges and therefore, the great guide for understanding 
by non-judges of what the place of the judiciary is in relation to 
constitutional questions. 
Leonard W. Levy, Editorial Note to James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
THE SUPREME COURT: SELECTED ESSAYS 43 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1967). 
Justice Holmes stated, "I agree with [Thayer's 1893 article] heartily and it 
makes explicit the point of view from which implicitly I have approached the 
constitutional questions upon which I have differed from some other judges." 
PAUL KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 84 (1992) (adding that, in addition to Thayer's 
professional and personal association with Holmes in private practice and at 
Harvard, "Louis Brandeis was a student of Thayer's, and Felix Frankfurter, who 
just missed Thayer at Harvard, acknowledged Thayer's substantial influence"). 
8. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) (quoted also in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 526-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
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constitutional rights must 'serve merely as counsels of 
moderation.",9 To Hand, then, the Bill of Rights "are [merely] 
precatory, and their specific implementation and effect must 
depend on the people and their elected representatives."lo 
Such Thayerian-style countermajoritarian difficulty arguments 
have largely prevailed throughout most of the twentieth century 
since 1937, such that for decades the Court's presumption-of-
constitutionality doctrine was virtually unchallenged among jurists 
and constitutional theorists, who, regardless of the interpretive 
methodes) employed, largely ceded the analytical high ground to 
the "government-first" position. As Rebecca Brown notes, "[e]ven 
the most sympathetic theorists tended to assume the role of 
apologist for judicial review .... ,,11 
In recent decades, however, increasing numbers of scholars 
have begun questioning whether such a sympathetic reading of 
Thayer and the resulting presumption-of-constitutionality doctrine 
might not throw the original Liberty baby out with the 
countermajoritarian-difficulty bathwater. Lawrence Gene Sager 
points out, for example, that we misread Thayer's rule-of-clear-
mistake if we assume legislative action defines the "outer 
boundary" of a constitutional norm. The judiciary may properly 
defer to a particular legislative act and yet reserve judgment on the 
full scope of protection offered by a particular constitutional 
provision. As Sager says, 
[Thayer's] judicial restraint thesis has retained its vitality, 
and continues to be instrumental in the judicial enforcement 
of the Constitution, as the federal judicial enforcement of 
9. Stephen M. Feldman, Unenumerated Rights in Different Democratic 
Regimes, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 79-80 (2006) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE 
CONTRmUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY TO CIVILIZATION (1942), 
reprinted in THE SPIRIT OF LmERTY 181 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952)). 
10. Id. at 80. 
II. Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 
COLUM. L. REv. 531, 532-33 (1998) ("Judgment . . . was recast as the 
unforgivable 'value imposition.' These attacks on the legitimacy of judgment in 
a democracy have left their mark not only on the academy, but also on the public 
understanding of the judicial role and on the Supreme Court's understanding of 
its own role. These effects, in turn, have had palpable implications for the 
recognition and enforcement of individual rights." (footnotes omitted)). 
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the equal protection clause so clearly indicates. But, under 
the influence of a vigorous tradition of Supreme Court 
enforcement of constitutional norms, we have come to lose 
sight of the fact that some judicial decisions reflect the 
tradition of judicial restraint and should not be understood 
to be exhaustive statements of the meaning of the 
implicated constitutional norms. 12 
Properly understood, 
The heart of Thayer's argument is [merely] that the 
legislature is charged with the responsibility of measuring 
its own conduct against the Constitution and that the 
judiciary should therefore not lightly reach a judgment on 
the constitutionality of a legislative act contrarr to the prior 
constitutional judgment of the legislature .... 1 
Archibald Cox offers a modem-day counterpoint to Judge 
Hand's extreme view, pointing out there is in fact good reason the 
Constitution subjects majoritarian democracy to judicial review: 
[C]ourts will be a great deal firmer and wiser than 
legislatures in interpreting constitutional guarantees which 
protect essential liberty. First, judicial interpretation gives 
better protection to unpopular individuals and minorities 
shut out of or inadequately represented in the political 
process. It was the Supreme Court that spoke for the 
national conscience in Brown v. Board of Education, when 
Congress and the President remained silent. Similarly, 
judicial review provides better protection over time for 
enduring values which politicians too often neglect and of 
which the people too often lose sight in the emotional 
intensity and maneuvering of political conflict. Individual 
liberties such as freedom of speech and guarantees of 
privacy are often in this character. 14 
12. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1224 (1978). 
13. Id at 1223. 
14. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and 
Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 565,572-73 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
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Rebecca Brown observes that majoritarian government exists, 
not for the sake of majoritarian government itself, but rather as a 
mechanism for protecting the people's Freedom: 
One of the genuinely unique aspects of the Constitution 
was its dependence on a principle of representation '''where 
all authority flows from and returns at stated periods to, the 
people.' . . . All parts of the government were equally 
responsible but limited spokesmen for the people, who 
remained as the absolute and perpetual sovereign, 
distributing bits and pieces of power to their various 
agents . ... The powers of the people were thus never 
alienated or surrendered to a legislature .... " 
This unique structure of American government, then, does 
not divide all power amongst the branches. It divides all 
delegated power amongst the branches, always retaining 
the role of the people as an overseer of the entire system. IS 
Once this relationship is understood, it becomes apparent that 
"John Hart Ely's theory ... lead[ing] to the conclusion that the Bill 
of Rights exists to support majoritarian government . . . had it 
exactly backwards. A better understanding of the system we have 
is that majoritarian government exists to support the Bill of 
Rights.,,16 
Indeed, the founders and framers themselves were well aware 
of the perils of leaving the People's liberties to the whims of direct 
and elected majorities. James Madison, for example, arguing in 
support of passage of the Bill of Rights before the First Congress, 
said, "[I]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves 
15. Brown, supra note 11, at 573-74 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REpUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 
596, 599-600 (1969) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Charles Pinckney in 4 THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 331 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1876)}}. See also Eugene V. 
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193, 
205, 197 (1952) (''The task of democracy is not to have the people vote directly 
on every issue, but to assure their ultimate responsibility for the acts of their 
representatives, elected or appointed [(including judges}]"; criticizing Hand's 
cramped view of judicial review as inappropriately based upon "dark shadows 
thrown upon the judiciary by the Court-packing fight of 1937"). 
16. Brown, supra note 11, at 574. 
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in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an 
impenetrable bulwark against eve!?; assumption of power in the 
legislative or executive . . . ." 7 In a letter to a French 
correspondent, Thomas Jefferson averred, "the laws of the land, 
administered by upright judges, . . . would protect you from any 
exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United 
States.,,18 Alexander Hamilton also commented in Federalist No. 
78 that, as paraphrased by Rebecca Brown, "the judiciary was 
entrusted with the primary responsibility for guarding the value 
that underlay the entire constitutional structure: The courts were 
expected to commit to 'inflexible and uniform adherence to the 
rights of the Constitution, and of individuals .... ",19 
What the founders, framers, and many other Americans since 
have shared is a common understanding that the irreducible 
nucleus around which all else orbits in America is liberty. The 
Declaration of Independence stakes the claim, and the Constitution 
issues the guarantee. In America, government-and democracy 
itself-is Liberty's servant, designed for the ultimate purpose of 
protecting the people's freedom. 
This essay argues that the Court's current presumption-of-
constitutionality standard of judicial review gives too much 
deference to government at the expense of Liberty. Part II 
describes the heavy influence of Lochner v. New YorKo on the 
development of the presumption-of-constitutionality doctrine, 
discussing both the conventional wisdom and more sympathetic 
(revisionist) views on the case; concluding that the case, despite its 
long-held pariah status, offers useful guidance moving forward for 
future judicial decision-making. Part III suggests the presumption-
of-constitutionality doctrine fails to do proper justice to the robust 
conception of Liberty under which the nation was founded, and 
offers a new Due Process Clause-based presumption-of-liberty 
standard of judicial review, modeled on the Court's existing First 
17. 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
18. Cox, supra note 14, at 572. 
19. Brown, supra note 11, at 571 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 441 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)). 
20. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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Amendment "reasonable time, place, and manner" doctrine.21 This 
approach, already championed on a narrow basis by the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Lutz v. York?-2 in 1990, more accurately 
honors the Constitution's core Liberty-first ideals, while also 
recognizing the proper constitutional role of government in 
maintaining law and order. 
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY DOCTRINE: 
LOCHNER'S LONG REACH 
Any discussion of the Court's presumption-of-constitutionality 
standard of judicial review must inevitably consider Lochner v. 
New York?-3 and its progeny. This part discusses the singular 
position Lochner has occupied over most of the past century as a 
constitutional outcast, giving voice to the assertion, implicit (at 
least) in much of the more recent scholarship, that Lochner at a 
rudimentary level provides a more properly balanced approach to 
reconciling government power and individual liberty than does the 
current standard of review. The Lochner doctrine, as applied by 
the Court, was sometimes seriously flawed (especialll when 
reviewing Acts of Congress during the New Deal era),2 but its 
underlying premise was sound. 
Generations of first-year constitutional law students have 
learned that Lochner v. New York?-5 is the constitutional 
21. Ideally, the analysis of individual Liberty should be located in the 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause, but absent the Court 
distinguishing the Slaughter-House Cases anytime soon, the analysis proceeds 
under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second 
Amendment Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 Mo. L. REv. 1 (2007) (suggesting the 
Court should revisit the debates in the 39th Congress concerning the proposal 
and passage of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, in which event it 
would find compelling evidence for a much broader interpretation of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause than allowed in Slaughter-House). 
22. 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990). 
23. 198 U.S. 45. 
24. See infra notes 103, 131 (briefly discussing Congress' elevated post-
Reconstruction constitutional power). 
25. 198 U.S. 45 (striking down a state law imposing maximum hours per 
week that bakers could work). "Lochner" is convenient shorthand for describing 
the Court's jurisprudence during the period spanning roughly 1897-1937, 
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Mephistopheles: an example of an anti-democratic Supreme Court 
usurping the authority of state- and federal-elected majorities with 
its too-close questioning of legislative power. The message, until 
recently, has been effective and complete. As David A. Strauss 
reports, 
Lochner v. New York wouldprobably win the prize, ifthere 
were one, for the most widely reviled decision of the last 
hundred years. . . . [J]udged by some rough-and-ready 
indicators-Would you ever cite this case in a Supreme 
Court brief, except to identify it with your opponents' 
position? If a judicial nominee avowed support for this 
case in a Senate confirmation hearing, would that 
immediately put an end to her chances?-Lochner is one of 
the great anti-precedents of the twentieth century. You 
have to reject Lochner if you want to be in the mainstream 
of American constitutional law today. 26 
beginning with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (stating liberty 
includes the right "to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, 
and essential" to engage in a trade or profession), and ending with West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state law imposing a 
mandatory minimum wage for female workers as within the state police power). 
26. David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 373, 
373 (2003) (footnotes omitted). See also Jack M. Balkin, Wrong the Day It Was 
Decided: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REv. 677, 682-83 
(2005) ("For many years, Lochner v. New York was an established element of 
the anti-canon, holding a position of infamy rivaled only by Plessy v. Ferguson 
and Dred Scott v. Sandford. A surefIre way to attack someone's views about 
constitutional theory was to argue that they led to Lochner. When John Rart Ely 
sought to denounce Roe v. Wade in 1973, he coined a term-'Lochnering'-to 
display his disagreement. Roe was Lochner, Ely proclaimed, and that was as 
damning an indictment as one could imagine. Ely threw down the gauntlet 
before an entire generation of legal scholars. They took up the challenge, 
attempting to show why Ely was wrong, and why you could love Roe and still 
hate Lochner . ... Until recently, few thought to deny the premise and argue that 
Lochner was perhaps not so wrong and that therefore it was not so urgent to 
distinguish it." (citing John Rart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on 
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (footnotes omitted)); Michael Les 
Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and 
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & RIST. REv. 293, 295 
(1985) ("Nothing can so damn a decision as to compare it to Lochner and its 
HeinOnline -- 68 La. L. Rev. 11 2007-2008
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The demonization was useful for a time,27 but with a century's 
passage, an increasing number of scholars (and Justices) are 
coming to realize Lochner is not the devil and are beginning to 
explain that the traditional Lochner story offers a problematic, and 
ultimately counterproductive, account. The Lochner-era Court, 
while it took ill-advised missteps along the way, offers "an 
otherwise sound path,,28 for reconciling the uneasy relationship of 
individual liberty and government power.29 
A. The Conventional Story 
For the past seventy years, Lochner has been constitutional 
law's favorite whipping-hoy, with the lashes coming from all 
directions30 including frequent self-flagellation by the Court 
ilk."); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the 
Origins o/Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1,5 n.12 (2003) 
("Lochner was so reviled that, between the demise of Lochner in West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish in 1937 and the publication of Bernard Siegan's Economic 
Liberties and the Constitution in 1980, it appears that only a single article that 
expressed even mild support for Lochner was published." (citing Guy Miller 
Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 
80 HARv. L. REv. 1463 (1967»). 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 43, 76 (discussing the political utility 
of Lochner-bashing). 
28. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 57. 
29. See, e.g., RANDy E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 222 (2004) ("[I]n Lochner and [subsequent] 
cases, the . . . Court began to require proof that both federal and state 
legislatures restricting the retained liberties of the people were actually pursuing 
a legitimate purpose rather than merely purporting to do so."). 
30. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 26, at 689 ("By the 1970's and 1980's 
conservatives opposed to what they saw as liberal judicial activism used 
Lochner's anti-canonical status to attack what they regarded as judicial 
overreaching by the Warren and early Burger Courts ... , [and] John Hart Ely, a 
liberal, showed his bona fides by attacking Roe as 'Lochnering' .... " (citing 
ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 44 (1990) ("arguing that Lochner is 'the symbol, indeed the 
quintessence, of judicial usurpation of power"'); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 
SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 205 (1987) ("arguing that Lochner is 
'one of the most ill-starred decisions that [the Court] ever rendered"'); Ely, 
supra note 26, at 943-44,940 ("arguing that Lochner and Roe are twin cases"». 
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itself.3) The actual source ofthe excitement, Lochner v. New York, 
struck down a New York statute limiting to sixty the number of 
hours bakers could work per week, with the Court reasoning, 
[T]here is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power 
by the state. . . . Otherwise the 14th Amendment would 
have no efficacy and the legislatures of the states would 
have unbounded power, and it would be enough to say that 
any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, 
the health, or the safety of the people; such legislation 
would be valid, no matter how absolutely without 
foundation the claim might be. The claim of the police 
power would be a mere pretext,-become another and 
delusive name for the supreme sovereignty of the state to 
be exercised free from constitutional restraint.32 
Juxtaposing its view of a circumscribed police power against 
constitutionally protected individual liberty interests-in this case, 
liberty of contract-the Lochner Court asked, "Is this a fair, 
reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, 
or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with 
the right of the individual to his personal liberty ... ?,,33 The Court 
concluded, "the limit of the police power has been reached and 
passed in this case .... The act is not, within any fair meaning of 
the term, a health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights 
31. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) ("The 
Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with 
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the 
language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully 
demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930s, 
which resulted in the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the Court 
placed on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."); 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("The doctrine that prevailed in 
Lochner ret al.] ... has long since been discarded. We have returned to the 
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and 
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass 
laws."). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 
(1955). 
32. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). 
33. !d. 
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of individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts 
d · I b ,,34 regar mg a or .... 
In the several decades thereafter, the Court applied the three 
major themes developed in Lochner: 
Freedom of contract was a right protected by the due 
process clausen . . . ; the government could interfere with 
freedom of contract only to serve a valid police purpose of 
protecting public health, public safety, or public morals; 
and the judiciary would carefully scrutinize [both the ends 
34. /d. at 58, 61. The four Lochner dissenting justices (Holmes, Harlan, 
White, and Day) "resolv[ed] the tension between rights and legislative power by 
adopting the Thayerian principle oflegislative deference." Barry Friedman, The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of 
Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383, 1432 (2001). Holmes stated that the Court 
should defer to the legislature "unless it can be said that a rational and fair man 
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental 
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and of 
our law." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Harlan, for his part, 
as commented upon by Barry Friedman, averred, 
"The responsibility ... rests upon legislators, not upon the courts," as 
legislation has duly "received the sanction of the people's 
representatives .... [I]t is the solemn duty of the courts ... to guard the 
constitutional rights of the citizen ... , [but] legislative enactments 
should be recognized and enforced by the courts as embodying the will 
of the people." 
Friedman, supra at 1431-32 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)) (footnotes omitted). Harlan identifies the issue to be: 
"[W]hat are the conditions under which the judiciary may declare such 
regulations to be in excess of legislative authority and void?" [and] 
goes on at length on this point earlier in his opinion, sounding at times 
more like Thayer than Thayer himself. Thus, "a legislative enactment, 
Federal or state, is never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be, 
beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative power." 
Rather, "[i]f there be doubt as to the validity of the statute, that doubt 
must therefore be resolved in favor of its validity, and the courts must 
keep their hands off, leaving the legislature to meet the responsibility 
for unwise legislation." 
/d. at 1432 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (footnotes 
omitted). Barnett points out the differences in tone of Holmes' and Harlan's 
dissents: "Harlan[] . . . more directly addressed the doctrine established by the 
Court. Unlike Holmes, Harlan did not disparage the nature of the fundamental 
liberty articulated by the majority." BARNETI, supra note 29, at 217. 
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and means of] le~islation to ensure that it truly served such 
a police purpose. 5 
The Court utilized these themes in striking down nearly 200 
state laws36 as inappropriately infringing upon individual liberty 
(sometimes expanded beyond freedom of contract to include other 
liberties). In the 1923 case Meyer v. Nebraska,37 for example, the 
Court held, 
[ under] established doctrine, . . . liberty may not be 
interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public 
interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without 
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency 
of the state to effect. Determination by the Legislature of 
what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final 
or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the COurtS.38 
35. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 590 (2d ed. 2002) ("[T]his [approach] is classic substantive due 
process: The due process clause was used not to ensure that the government 
followed proper procedures, but to ensure that laws served an adequate 
purpose. "). 
36. Id. at 592 (citing BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1942); PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, 
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 299 
(3d ed. 1992)). 
37. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state law 
prohibiting the teaching of German in public schools). Ironically, Meyer is the 
case the modem Supreme Court often invokes for explaining the principles of 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 
86-93, demonstrating the hollowness of the Court's and others' continuing 
vilification of all-things-Lochner. 
38. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (1923) ("Without doubt, ['liberty'] denotes 
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men." (citations omitted)). 
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The Court repudiated Lochner in 1937 in West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish,39 replacing it with a doctrine substantially more 
deferential to government power: 
In prohibiting that deprivation [ of liberty], the Constitution 
does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty .... 
[T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization 
which requires the protection of law against the evils which 
menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the 
people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily 
subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation 
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted 
in the interests of the community is due process.40 
Conceptually aided a year later by Carolene Products Footnote 
Four,41 the Court then built the highly deferential presumption-of-
constitutionality edifice that survives to this day42-leaving 
Lochner to its ignominious fate as a constitutional pariah. 
39. 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937) (upholding a Washington state law imposing a 
mandatory minimum wage for female workers, recognizing that regulations 
addressing the inequality of bargaining power in the employment context are a 
legitimate exercise of state authority: "In dealing with the relation of employer 
and employed, the Legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order 
that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace and 
good order may be promoted through regulations designed to insure wholesome 
conditions of work and freedom from oppression." (citations omitted)). 
40. Id. at 391. 
41. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those ofthe first ten Amendments, which 
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."). 
Footnote Four has been commonly interpreted in one of two ways: (1) allowing 
heightened standard of review for enumerated Bill of Rights protections alone; 
and (2) allowing heightened standard of review for enumerated Bill of Rights 
protections plus select unenumerated "fundamental rights" as identified by the 
Court. See, e.g., BARNETI, supra note 29, at 253-54 (describing the two 
approaches as "Footnote Four" and "Footnote Four Plus," respectively). A 
broader liberty-friendly reading of Footnote Four, as proposed herein, would go 
beyond both of these interpretations and allow heightened scrutiny for 
government restrictions on aU liberty interests. See infra Part III.C.2. 
42. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 540-41 (2d ed. 
2006) (stating the new doctrine "was a victory for legal realists, who 
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Jack M. Balkin suggests the case achieved its "anti-canonical" 
status for essentially political reasons: 
Following the struggle over the New Deal and the 
ascendancy of the Roosevelt Court, Lochner symbolized 
the constitutional regime that had just been overthrown .... 
[W]hat Lochner symbolized, had to be understood as 
deviant. 
[Accordingly,] [t]he Lochner narrative that we have 
inherited . . . projects on to the Supreme Court between 
1897 to 1937 a series of undesirable traits-the very 
opposite of those characteristics that supporters of the New 
Deal settlement wanted to believe about themselves. . . . 
Thus, during the "Lochner Era" courts employed a rigid 
formalism that neglected social realities, while the New 
Deal engaged in a vigorous pragmatism that was keenly 
attuned to social and economic change. The Lochner Era 
Court imposed laissez-faire conservative values through its 
interpretations of national power and the Due Process 
Clause, while the New Deal brought flexible and pragmatic 
notions of national power that were necessary to protect the 
public interest. Finally, the Justices during the Lochner Era 
repeatedly overstepped their appropriate roles as judges by 
reading their own political values into the Constitution and 
second guessing the work of democratically elected 
legislatures and democratically accountable executive 
officials, while the New Deal revolution produced a new 
breed of Justices who believed in judicial restraint and 
undermined Lochner's intellectual foundations with their arguments that 
because law reflects political choices, there is no reason for the Court to 
overturn decisions made through the political process") (citing, e.g., HOWARD 
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER 
ERA POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE (1993); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870--1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY (1992». 
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appropriate respect for democratic processes in ordinary 
social and economic regulation.43 
17 
Barry Cushman captures the extravagant flavor of some of the 
criticism: "One can hardly avoid coming away from these . . . 
decisions with the impression that these were men fanatically 
devoted to property rights and callously indifferent to the 
commonweal. ,,44 Contrary to conventional wisdom of the Four 
Horsemen45 as "driven [solely] by 'their basic and bone-deep 
Hamiltonian empathy with the well-to-do,,,,46 Cushman attributes 
more calculated motives to them: 
[In fact] [t]he Four Horsemen were themselves closet 
liberals. It appears that they struck a reactionary pose in 
celebrated cases in order to retain the good graces of the 
43. Balkin, supra note 26, at 685-86 (citing, e.g., Friedman, supra note 34, 
at 1383, 1385 & n.5) (footnotes omitted). Balkin goes on to describe the 
systematic debunking of the Lochner myth. /d. at 687 (citing Friedman, supra 
note 34, at 1390-1402; Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & 
HIST. REv. 631 (2002); James A. Thomson, Swimming in the Air: Melville W 
Fuller and the Supreme Court 1888-1910, 27 CUMBo L. REv. 139, 140-41 & n.6 
(1996)). 
44. Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REv. 
559,559 (1997) (referring to the decisions in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 
238 (1936); Morehead v. New York ex reI. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); R.R. 
Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (l935); Ribnik V. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 
(1928); Adkins V. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Hammer V. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); referring to the dissents in Home Bldg. & Loan 
Ass'n V. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Nebbia 
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting); the Gold 
Clause Cases-Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 361 (l935) 
(McReynolds, 1., dissenting), Nortz V. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 361 (l935) 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting), Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 361 (1935) 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting); the Wagner Act Cases-Assoc. Press V. NLRB, 
301 U.S. 103, 133 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting), NLRB v. Friedman-Harry 
Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 76 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting), 
NLRB V. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 76 (1937) (McReynolds, J., 
dissenting), NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76 (1937) 
(McReynolds, 1., dissenting)). 
45. "The Four Horsemen" was the nickname given the four Lochner Era 
Justices-McReynolds, Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Butler-who 
consistently voted to strike down legislation. 
46. Cushman, supra note 44, at 560 (quoting FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790-1955, at 217 (1955)). 
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conservative sponsors to whom they owed their positions 
and whose social amenities they continued to enjoy, while 
in legions of low-profile cases they quietly struck blows for 
their own left-liberal agendas. . . . Theirs, then, is not a 
simple story of handmaidens of the industrial and financial 
elite. It is instead a tale ofluxury and deceit.47 
Conspiracy theories aside, most conventional criticisms of 
Lochner have included one or more of the following: (1) its 
laissez-faire economic policy preferences perpetuated a pernicious 
form of Social Darwinism;48 (2) it was infected with an elitist class 
bias favoring large corporations and disfavoring workers;49 (3) 
once the doctrine was established, "even Justices not inclined to 
[the Lochnerian] ideology felt obligated to formalistically follow 
precedent, ignoring social conditions and the need for ameliorative 
47. Id. at 560--61. See also IRVING BRANT, STORM OVER THE 
CONSTITUTION 240 (1936) (describing Supreme Court opinions as aligned with 
the interests of the industrial oligarchy). What did the Lochner Court do to 
engender this sort of enmity? For some forty years around the turn of the 
twentieth century it required government to justify its actions, and on over 200 
occasions, it found the government explanations wanting, and hence struck 
down the actions. 
48. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 2 (citing, e.g., FRANK R. STRONG, 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE 
95 (1986)). The charge originates with Justice Holmes' famous dissenting 
comment, "The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social 
Statics." Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
49. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 34, at 1454 (stating typical criticisms 
during the Lochner-era itself were that "class bias and ideology were deciding 
cases, not law, . . . [and that] the judges [were] employing novel and 
unprecedented rules to resolve legal controversies"); Bernstein, supra note 26, at 
2-3 (citing, e.g., DERRICK A BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d. 
ed. 1992) ("Called upon to decide pressing questions concerning the relations of 
labor and capital, the power of state legislatures, and the rights of big business, 
the courts foreswore impartiality and came down heavily on the side of 
economic interests."); LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION, 1877-1917, at 185 (1971) ("referring to the Court's 'familiar 
pattern of favoring employers at the expense of employees "'); ARCHIBALD Cox, 
THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 134-37 (1987) ("claiming that the Supreme 
Court engaged in a willful defense of wealth and power")). 
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legislation";So and (4) it was an illegitimate "countermajoritarian" 
judicial action by the Court "into a realm properly reserved to the 
political branches of government."Sl 
50. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 3-4 (citing, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Ideology and 
Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54 UMKC L. REv. 175, 180-82 
(1986) ("describing Lochner as elevating formalist logic above empirical data"); 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REv. 461, 467 (1916) 
("bemoaning the purported abstract reasoning and legal formalism that led 
judges to invalidate reform legislation"); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 616 (1908) ("attacking the Court for 
invalidating laws based on logical deduction rather than considering whether the 
law was needed to address a specific problem")). 
51. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874 
( 1987) (citing, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1979) (basing 
objections on "distinctions between matters of policy, to be resolved by the 
legislature, and matters of principle, to be resolved by the courts"); Robert Bork, 
Neutral Principles and some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) 
(basing objection on "conceptions of democracy")). Alexander Bickel called 
this final criticism "the influential and ultimately decisive criticism of the 
Court." Strauss, supra note 26, at 375-76 (quoting BICKEL, supra note 4, at 46). 
See also Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. 
REv 821 (2005) ("It was also during the Lochner era that the now-ubiquitous 
'countermajoritarian difficulty' was formulated"). Barry Friedman suggests the 
countermajoritarian complaint was at the core of the Populist and Progressive 
Movements in the early decades of the twentieth century: "[T]he dominant 
political movements of the time shared, at least at the level of rhetoric, a taste 
for popular democracy [and judicial] deference to majoritarian legislative will." 
Friedman, supra note 34, at 1432 (citing ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF RULE: A 
CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 124, 163 (1995) ("claiming that 
according to Populists, 'the People were the government'" . . . . 'One 
[Progressive] reform strategy . . . called for new means of direct democracy: 
popular initiative in legislation, a referendum on a significant law or issue, and 
ways to recall public officials, perhaps even judicial decisions. "')). Further, "the 
Progressive reaction to Lochner harped repeatedly on the theme of judicial 
deference to majoritarian judgments," id. at 1437 (citing L.B. Boudin, 
Government By Judiciary, 26 POL. SCI. Q. 238, 264 (1911), and "'Progressives 
wanted to make governments truly responsive and responsible by a package of 
democratic measures,'" id. at 1434 n.246 (quoting SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, 
AMERICA IN THE AGE OF THE TITANS: THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND WORLD WAR 
I, at 52 (1988)). Moreover, Friedman reports, 
The countermajoritarian problem was a hot issue in the 1912 election 
.... Theodore Roosevelt, campaigning for the presidency, published 
several articles on his stance on the judiciary in The Outlook, arguing 
that if the courts continue to strike down laws of public interest, "it will 
prove well-nigh impossible to prevent States from acting when they 
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B. The Story Revised 
Notwithstanding the democratic-appeal of Thayerian-style 
deference, we must not forget that at the turn of the century the 
nation was only a few decades removed from the greatest stain 
ever on the American character: human slavery. Keith E. 
Whittington suggests that it is therefore understandable, "[i]n the 
face of a new activism on the part of American governments and in 
the wake of post-abolitionist sensibilities about the threat that 
legislatures and democratic majorities could pose to individual 
liberty, [that] the Court was not disposed to heeding the Thayerian 
call for deference.,,52 Government-particularly state government 
-had been lauded at the founding and framing as being the great 
protector of freedom, but the many decades following 
demonstrated that assumption to be the miserable miscalculation 
that it was. If the states would not protect Liberty, the Constitution 
provided that the Court (and Congress, through Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendmenti3 woukl4-and so it did during the 
Lochner era. 55 
have a furiously indignant public opinion behind them, and there will 
be a real popular loss of confidence in the courts . . . ." Roosevelt 
urged a recall of unpopular judicial decisions and condemned courts 
"steeped in some outworn political or social philosophy ... [that] 
totally misapprehend their relations to the people and to the public 
needs." At the Progressive Convention, Roosevelt said: "The 
American people and not the courts are to determine their own 
fundamental policies." 
Id at 1443-44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt, Nationalism 
and the Judiciary, 97 OUTLOOK 532, 536 (1911); Judges and Progress, 100 
OUTLOOK 40, 40 (1912); Purposes and Policies of the Progressive Party, Speech 
Before the Progressive Convention (Aug. 6, 1912), in S. Doc. No. 62-904, at 8 
(1912». 
52. Whittington, supra note 51, at 822. 
53. See infra notes 103, 131 and accompanying text. 
54. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION iii (3d ed. 1874) ("[T]here are on all sides 
definite limitations which circumscribe the legislative authority, independent of 
the specific restrictions which the people impose by their State constitutions .... 
[Courts may set aside state law even absent] some specific inhibition which has 
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Assuming most Americans would agree the Court was justified 
in striking down at least the most egregious state laws, the mere 
fact that Lochner engendered such long-standing enmity from 
almost all quarters suggests something was wrong with the Court's 
performance. Discounting the earlier demonizing, bordering-on-
irrational accounts, a number of recent commentaries offer more 
helpful explanations for what went wrong in Lochner.56 Taken 
together, the accounts point to two fatal errors: (1) somewhere 
along the way the Court lost its sense of balance by 
disproportionately elevating the liberty of contract over valid 
countervailing concerns of basic fairness;s7 and (2) during the New 
been disregarded, or some express command which has been disobeyed."); 
Bernstein, supra note 26, at 31 ("When leading postbellum lawyers considered 
American constitutionalism, they thought of it not as being solely the powers 
and prohibitions contained within the four comers of a document. Rather, they 
took a cue from British constitutional theorists, who posited that England had a 
'constitution' despite the absence of any such written document. American 
theorists argued that the United States, too, had an unwritten constitution, one 
that complemented and supplemented the written document. This idea was 
sufficiently widely accepted that the Supreme Court declared in 1875 that 
'[t]here are limitations on [government] power which grow out of the essential 
nature of all free governments."') (quoting Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 
Wall.) 655, 663 (1874)); Whittington, supra note 51, at 822-23 (suggesting the 
Court's active approach to state legislation is appropriate: "While state laws may 
reflect local political majorities, it is not always clear that they represent the will 
of national majorities, and the judiciary is importantly charged with the task of 
insuring the supremacy of national constitutional and policy commitments over 
those of states and localities."). 
55. Whittington, supra note 51, at 822-23 ("Historically speaking, the states 
did not fare well before the Lochner Court."). See infra text accompanying 
notes 1 02-13 for discussion of the Lochner Court's decidedly different 
treatment of Acts of Congress in other-than the New Deal years. 
56. Why the change in tone? With passage of time, emotions from the 
Depression and New Deal have cooled, and with the benefit of the added 
distance, commentators can interpret the case with greater objectivity. See e.g., 
Balkin, supra note 26, at 688, 691 ("We no longer live in the immediate wake of 
the struggles over the New Deal, as did the legal scholars of the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1960s. Rather, the New Deal has receded to the background, giving way to 
later, more urgent struggles .... With the distance of a century, there is less 
need to caricature the past or view it in monolithic terms. The great battles have 
been fought long ago."). 
57. See infra text accompanying notes 59--65. 
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Deal it failed to properly consider the constitutional role of the 
coequal federal branches in implementing national economic and 
social policy. 58 
Regarding the first, David A. Strauss suggests that the 
Lochner-era Court's error was its 
treat[ment of] freedom of contract as a cornerstone of the 
constitutional order and [its] systematic[] undervalu[ation 
of] reasons for limiting or overriding the right. It is one 
thing to enforce freedom of contract in a limited and 
qualified way; it is quite another to make freedom of 
contract a preeminent constitutional value that repeatedly 
prevails over legislation that, in the eyes of elected 
representatives, serves important social purposes. 59 
Further, the problem 
was not that the Court misconceived the judicial role or did 
not understand how to interpret the Constitution. The 
justices' failure was in a sense a lack of humility: an 
inability, or refusal, to understand that although they were 
vindicating an important value, matters were more 
complicated than they thought. 60 
Properly exercised, 
58. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99. 
59. Strauss, supra note 26, at 373, 375 (continuing, "[T]he Lochner-era 
Court acted defensibly in recognizing freedom of contract but indefensibly in 
exalting it. Freedom of contract, judged by the standards that developed in the 
last half of the twentieth century, is a plausible constitutional right. It might 
merit careful, case-by-case enforcement, undertaken with sensitivity to the 
limitation of the right as well as its value. The Lochner-era Court went far 
beyond that. "). See a/so LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1371 (3d ed. 2000) (stating Lochner's error was not that it sought to protect 
unenumerated rights, but rather that its choice of the particular rights to protect 
"badly distorted the character and needs of the human condition, the reality of 
the economic situation, and the relationship between political choices and legal 
rules"). See a/so infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
60. Strauss, supra note 26, at 386 ("There is a time for judicial crusades on 
behalf of principles of the highest importance; the Warren Court's campaign 
against racial discrimination is an example."). 
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judicial review requires courts to recognize the complexity 
of the issues they confront and to develop doctrines that, 
while vindicating constitutional rights, also accommodate 
values that are in tension with those rights. Lochner 
presented the latter, but the Court treated it as the former, 
and that is why Lochner deserves the reputation it has 
today.61 
23 
In short, it was primarily the Lochner Court's tone-deafness to 
societal needs in pushing the freedom of contract (the first of the 
three major themes enunciated in Lochner)62 beyond its natural 
boundaries-not the very fact that the Court was engaging in 
searchin§ scrutiny (the second and third major enunciated 
themes)6 -that earned it its dubious reputation.64 
Cass R. Sunstein comments, "Lochner was wrongly decided, 
and one of the reasons that it was wrong is that it depended on 
baselines [i.e., "natural, immutable common law rules" regarding, 
for example, freedom of contract] and consequent understandings 
of action and neutrality that were inappropriate for constitutional 
analysis.,,65 He further observes that the defining Lochner 
approach-{ I) the "sharp limitation of the category of permissible 
government ends" and (2) a more searching "means-end scrutiny" 
to '''flush-out' impermissible ends,,66-while scaled back, "has 
61. /d. 
62. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
63. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
64. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99 for discussion of "social 
legitimacy" as a necessary criterion (together with "legal legitimacy") for 
judicial legitimacy. 
65. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 903. 
66. Id. at 877-78; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 477 (citing 
ARNOLD PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1-2, 5 (1960». 
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hardly been overruled,,67 in such areas as campaign finance,68 
procedural and substantive due process,69 and state action.7o 
While generally critical, Professors Strauss and Sunstein 
acknowledge the backlash against Lochner has itself gone too far. 
Sunstein suggests, "The Holmesian position [abandoning baseline 
constitutional principles in favor of majoritarianism], reflected in 
some traditional thinking about Lochner, would amount to an 
abandonment of constitutionalism altogether. Its crude and 
conclusory references to the primacy of electoral politics are 
insufficient to support that abandonment.,,71 Strauss comments 
that the extreme deference granted state legislatures by the post-
Lochner Court "seem[s] nearly indefensible. The laws involved in 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. and Ferguson v. Skrupa, for 
example, seem very hard to justify."n 
67. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 874-75 (characterizing the Lochner 
approach as "a mistake"). 
68. Id. at 884 ("Buckley [v. Valeo] is a direct heir to Lochner. In both cases, 
the existing distribution of wealth is seen as natural, and failure to act is treated 
as no decision at all. Neutrality is inaction, reflected in a refusal to intervene in 
markets or to alter the existing distribution of wealth."). 
69. Id. at 885. ("Lochner-like premises powerfully influence [procedural 
and substantive due process] debate[s] .... [T]he Court's failure to put benefits 
said to be created by the government [statutes] on the same footing with benefits 
said to be 'natural' is a clear holdover from the Lochner period. "). 
70. Id. at 887, 889 (opining the Court's state action cases "confirm that the 
[Court's] state action inquiry is not a search for whether the state has 'acted,' but 
instead an examination of whether it has deviated from functions that are 
perceived as normal and desirable ... [an] examination ... powerfully 
influenced by the common law ... [and] defmed in terms that are reminiscent of 
that in Lochner . ... [G]ovemment ha[s] no duty to remove barriers 'not of its 
own creation.' The idea is that poverty is simply 'there'; it is not a product of 
government action. By now it should be easy to see that this idea depends on 
Lochner-like definitions of neutrality, inaction, and appropriate baselines." 
(quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)). The Court's approach in 
the administrative law realm, with its willingness to review agency "action" but 
not agency "inaction" (presumed unreviewable) bear this out as well: "This 
understanding is a direct modem analogue to Lochner . . . . Governmental 
'inaction' is treated as neutral and legally unobjectionable; indeed, it does not 
furnish a predicate for judicial intervention." Id. at 892. 
71. Id. at 906 (citation omitted). 
72. Strauss, supra note 26, at 386 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 
(1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)). 
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Some critics find silver linings. Owen Fiss suggests, for 
example, "Lochner may be illegitimate and an error, but once we 
see clearly what it was trying to do, we may wish to criticize its 
substantive values and yet leave unimpeached its conception of 
[the judicial] role-which it shared in common with Brown [v. 
Board of Education].,,73 The Justices in the Lochner majority 
acted on principle, "believ[ing] that the Constitution embodies a 
set of values that exists apart from, and above, ordinary politics 
and that their duty was to give, through exercise of reason, 
concrete meaning and expression to these values.,,74 
It is a mistake, moreover, to continue to assert that the Lochner 
Court strayed from the original understandings of the Fourteenth 
Amendment concerning the judicial role, only to return to its 
senses in 1937.75 As Jack M. Balkin explains, the more accurate 
story is that 
the [Lochner Court] jurisprudence of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries reflected ideas quite familiar 
to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment; namely, that 
the Amendment was designed to prevent so-called 'class 
legislation' that favored one group over another, an idea 
which developed out of Jacksonian and free labor 
ideology.76 
73. OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 19 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1993). 
74. Id at 20. 
75. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730--31 (1963) (Black, J., 
concurring) ("The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, 
and like cases-that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional 
when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been 
discarded. "). 
76. Balkin, supra note 26, at 687-88 (citing GILLMAN, supra note 42, at 10--
13, 21, 33-60; Benedict, supra note 26, at 318). See also PAUL, supra note 66, 
at 72; Bernstein, supra note 26, at 35-38; Thomas B. McAffee, Overcoming 
Lochner in the Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights and Popular 
Sovereignty Seriously as We Seek to Secure Equal Citizenship and Promote the 
Public Good 31 n.108 (Sept. 21, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
BePress) ("[T]here is not much question that some members of the Supreme 
Court-perhaps most starkly, Justice Field-wanted to read the Fourteenth 
Amendment as legally protecting the inalienable natural rights referred to in the 
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"Indeed," Professor Balkin suggests, "once we understand the 
underlying assumptions of the [Chief Justice] Fuller Court, 
Holmes' dissent in Lochner is the true outlier, because it rejects the 
premises of police power jurisprudence and asserts an almost total 
power in legislatures akin to that of the British Parliament.,,77 
Professor Balkin's comments largely echo those in Howard 
Gillman's influential 1993 book, The Constitution Besieged,78 
which cogently explains that Lochner "represented a well-
developed, albeit increasingly untenable, conception of the 
appropriate relationship between the state and society,,79 as 
understood in state and federal courts throughout much of the 
preceding century: 
[T]he standards used by these judges to evaluate exercises 
of legislative power were not illegitimate creations of 
unrestrained free-market ideologues, but rather had their 
roots in principles of political legitimacy that were forged 
at the time of the creation of the Constitution and were later 
elaborated by state court judges as they first addressed the 
nature and scope of legislative power in the era of 
Jacksonian democracy .... 
. . . . Many of the familiar cases of this period [i.e., the 
postbellum era]-such as Slaughterhouse, Munn, Butchers' 
Union, Barbier, Yick Wo, and Powell,-take on a new 
meaning once we appreciate the extent to which they 
represent a continuation of a tradition whereby judges 
attempted to define the boundaries of state power by 
drawing distinctions between legislation that legitimately 
Declaration of Independence." (citing Muon v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 141-42 
(1876) (Field, J., dissenting». 
77. Balkin, supra note 26, at 692 (footnotes omitted) ("Because Holmes' 
dissent rejected the background assumptions of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, it was celebrated by progressives and New Dealers .... 
Justice Harlan's dissent, by contrast, inhabits the same world of police power 
jurisprudence as Justice Peckham's majority opinion, and hence could not serve 
as a rallying cry for the New Deal."). 
78. GILLMAN, supra note 42. 
79. Id. at 18. 
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promoted the general welfare and legislation that 
illegitimately promoted the special interests of particular 
groups and classes.8o 
27 
Gillman concludes that "the judiciary's persistent attachment to 
traditional limits on legislative power" epitomized in Lochner-
far from being an anomalous departure from principles firmly 
grounded upon the Constitution-instead "represented the final 
defense of a principle of political legitimacy that the framers 
sought to permanently enshrine in the fundamental law, ... [and 
that had] helped shape state-society relations in the United States 
for a century and a half.,,81 Accordingly, it was actually the post-
Lochnerian "rise of a new American Republic organized around a 
different understanding of the proper use of legislative power" that 
represented the "collapse" of traditionally recognized 
constitutional principles.82 
David E. Bernstein, on the basis of his exhaustive work on the 
Lochner project, suggests we should view Lochner "as a misste£ 
on an otherwise sound path, not an irredeemable mistake." 3 
While acknowledging the value of Professor Gillman's class-
legislation thesis for describing circumstances at the tum of the 
80. Id. at 10, 14 (emphasis added). 
81. Id at 15. 
82. Id See also Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 
27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 716 (1975) ("Intellectually, the 18th-century 
philosophical framework supporting the concept of immutable natural rights was 
eroded with the growth of legal positivism, ethical relativism, pragmatism, and 
historicism. "). 
83. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 57. He notes, "This is the consistent 
position of Justice David Souter" in, for example, Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 760--61 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he cases in the Lochner line 
routinely invoked a correct standard of constitutional arbitrariness review.") /d. 
at 57 n.319. Professor Bernstein's works on Lochner include: Thoughts on 
Hodges v. United States, 85 B.U. L. REv. 811 (2005); Bolling, Equal Protection, 
Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005); Lochner v. New 
York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005); Bernstein, 
supra note 26; Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2003); Book 
Review: Lochner's Feminist Legacy, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1960 (2003); Lochner, 
Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211 (1999); 
Roots of the "Underclass": The Decline of Laissez-Faire Jurisprudence and the 
Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 85 (1993). 
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century,84 Professor Bernstein claims that Gillman overstates the 
influence of aversion to class-legislation on the Lochner Court's 
decision-making,85 suggesting instead that "the basic motivation 
for Lochnerian jurisprudence was the Justices' belief that 
Americans had fundamental unenumerated constitutional rights, 
and that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protected 
those rights. ,,86 This perspective, he observes, is the very basis for 
84. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 12-13 (explaining that Gillman accurately 
shows the influence of hostility to special interest legislation in American 
political thought and the use of class legislation analysis in state and U.S. 
Supreme Court decision-making during the immediate pre-Lochner period). 
Comprehensively surveying the literature on Lochner over the past century, 
Bernstein observes, 
Among constitutional law professors, the most popular understanding 
of Lochner is Cass Sunstein's view that the Court believed that 
common law rules were natural and immutable and therefore formed 
the appropriate baseline from which to judge the constitutionality of 
regulatory legislation. 
Legal historians, meanwhile, pay little heed to Sunstein's rather 
impressionistic understanding of Lochner . .. [and] [i]nstead ... have 
generally adopted Howard Gillman's thesis ... that the Court was 
motivated by opposition to "class legislation." . . . Gillman's 
understanding of Lochner is gradually winning an increasing audience 
among mainstream constitutional scholars and threatens to eventually 
supplant Sunstein's interpretation as the conventional understanding of 
Lochner among law professors. 
Id. at 11-12 (footnotes omitted). Bernstein suggests part of Gillman's theory's 
appeal is its normative value to academics seeking to distance themselves from 
Lochner. See generally id. 
85. Id. at 12-15. "If Gillman is correct, some of the Supreme Court's most 
beloved and controversial liberal modem fundamental rights decisions-notably 
Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade-would be immunized from the 
longstanding charge that they are Lochner's illegitimate offspring." Id. at 60. 
Cj Feldman, supra note 9, at 49 n.l1 ("[Professor] Bernstein ... seems to 
misunderstand the proscription of class legislation. In particular, Bernstein does 
not give enough weight to the fact that legislatures could infringe on individual 
liberties to promote the common good." (citing WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE 
PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA passim (1996) ("discussing at length nineteenth century cases 
contrasting the common good and partial or private interests"); G. EDWARD 
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 246-51 (2000) ("following 
Gillman's approach"))). 
86. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 12. "[B]y the time Lochner was decided, 
there was a broad consensus that the Due Process Clause protected fundamental 
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modem substantive due process: "It turns out ... that Griswold,87 
Roe,88 and their progeny [including Casey89 and Lawrence90] can 
be traced back to Lochner.,,91 Indeed, it was a Lochner-era Court 
rights from state intrusion." [d. at 35. Bernstein locates the source of these 
fundamental rights in "the American natural rights tradition, tempered by a 
historicist perspective" and describes natural rights theory in this context as "the 
idea that individuals possess prepolitical rights that antedate positive law and 
that can be discovered through human reason." [d. Bernstein explains that by 
1905 
a virtual consensus seems to have developed among the Justices that due 
process principles protected fundamental rights that were antecedent to 
government. . . . The main dispute in the Court was not over the 
existence of fundamental judicially-enforceable unenumerated rights, nor 
was the dispute primarily about the content of those rights .... [Rather,] 
the Justices disagreed about how vigorously fundamental rights should 
be enforced against the states, and more specifically, whether there 
should be a presumption of constitutionality and how strong such a 
presumption should be. 
Id. at 37-38 (citing Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the 
American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 2-22 (1991), id. at 37 
n.197, and noting that the scope of the presumption "was the main dispute 
between the majority in Lochner and Justice Harlan's dissent," id. at 38 n.203). 
87. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down, on equal 
protection privacy grounds, a state law banning the use and sale of contraceptive 
to married persons). 
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down, on due process 
privacy grounds, a state law prohibiting all abortions). 
89. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming, on due 
process privacy grounds, Roe v. Wade). 
90. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down, on due process 
liberty grounds, a state law punishing sodomy). 
91. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 60 (emphasis in original) ("When Lochner 
came to full fruition in the 1920s, it ushered in an era in which the Court largely 
ignored equal protection[-class legislation] concerns in favor of aggressive 
enforcement of un enumerated due process rights .... After a twenty-five year or 
so hiatus, Lochnerian fundamental rights analysis returned in mutated form in 
Griswold, minus the liberty of contract notion, with less overt historicism, and 
with a negligible concept of police powers. The recent Lawrence opinion 
asserting a Fourteenth Amendment right for adults to engage in homosexual 
sodomy is even more Lochnerian because the Court has fully shifted from 
protecting 'privacy,' which at least had the pretense on relying on penumbral 
rights, to protecting' liberty. '''). 
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(the Taft Court) that decided Meyer v. Nebraska92 and Pierce v. 
Society of the Sisters,93 the foundational darlings of modem 
substantive due process cases striking down state laws for 
depriving persons of unenumerated fundamental rights and liberty 
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.94 
C. The Story Moving Forward 
If one agrees with Cass R. Sunstein that at least part of the goal 
in assessing the Lochner saga should be to use the lessons learned 
to develop new ways of advancing justice,95 what does Lochner 
teach? 
First, as discussed above,96 it teaches that while the Lochner 
Court inappropriately elevated freedom of contract beyond its 
constitutional bounds, it established a sound doctrinal path for the 
judicial reconciliation of individual rights and government power. 
Second, it offers a cautionary tale that the Supreme Court 
repeatedly disregards the national will-as expressed through the 
policies of the co-equal democratically elected federal legislative 
and executive btanches--only at its peril. 
Regarding the latter, Barry Friedman posits, 
92. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down, on liberty grounds, state law 
prohibiting the teaching of German in public schools). 
93. 268 U.S. 510 (1927) (striking down, on liberty grounds, a state law 
banning private schools). 
94. See a/so, e.g., Strauss, supra note 26, at 375 (observing "[t]bree widely-
accepted developments" over the past fifty years: (1) the Court has enforced 
fundamental rights in a Lochnerian sort of way, sometimes in face of significant 
popular opposition; (2) the Court has recognized unenumerated constitutional 
rights; and (3) there is, among many, "an enhanced understanding of both the 
virtues and the limitations of freedom of contract and economic markets-an 
understanding that validates the Lochner-era Court's concern with freedom of 
contract but impugns many of the specific decisions that the Court made as it 
enforced the right"). 
95. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 918-19 ("[T]he task for the future is to 
develop theories of distributive justice, derived from constitutional text and 
purposes, that might serve as the basis for evaluating any particular practice. 
Whether and how to develop and implement such theories is a mixture of 
substantive and institutional problems."). 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65, 71-74, 83-94. 
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the work of constitutional judges must have both "legal" 
and "social" legitimacy .... The proper lesson of Lochner 
instructs us that, even where it is possible to identify a 
jurisprudential [legal] basis for judicial decisions, if those 
familiar with the Court's decisions do not believe those 
decisions will be socially correct, the work of judges will 
be seen as illegitimate.97 
Friedman explains: 
[L]egal legitimacy, at least under ordinary circumstances 
and with regard to constitutional litigation, is a relatively 
easy test to meet. Cases rarely are litigated through the 
hierarchy of trial and appellate courts with no plausible 
doctrinal and jurisprudential argument on the other side. 
Legal legitimacy demands no more.98 
Standing alone, however, legal legitimacy may not suffice 
in the eyes of the public to legitimate the work of 
constitutional judges. Judges rendering decisions that are 
legally legitimate but socially unacceptable will be 
attacked. Moreover, the attack may well take the form that 
judges are acting lawlessly. 
Stated differently, strong disagreement over social 
legitimacy puts pressure on perceptions of legal legitimacy. 
When decisions are seen as contrary to the needs of society, 
observers are unlikely to concede legal legitimacy, and rest 
31 
97. Friedman, supra note 34, at 1387 (footnotes omitted) ("Social 
legitimacy looks beyond jurisprudential antecedents of constitutional decisions 
and asks whether those decisions are widely understood to be the correct ones 
given the social and economic milieu in which they are rendered."). 
98. Based on this test, most reasonable observers would agree the Lochner 
decision was, at least, "lawful." Id. at 1453-54 ("[The] claim that Lochner-era 
judges were acting in a lawful fashion cannot be very big news. . . . Is it 
imaginable that numerous judges around the country simply began to decide 
cases in a lawless fashion? They were, after all, lawyers brought up in a 
common law system. It is difficult to picture them (all of them, some quite 
independently) deciding cases out of the blue, without reliance on existing 
doctrine and jurisprudential ideas .... Common law judges are unlikely, under 
relatively ordinary circumstances and across a range of many cases, to cast the 
law aside in a way that we would be willing to say the decisions were legally 
illegitimate. "). 
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entirely upon a claim about social propriety. Critics of the 
judicial decisions will attack the law as itself the problem. 
And, decisions that are understood as socially illegitimate 
may ultimately cause the law to change. 99 
It is important to distinguish the Lochner Court's relatively 
deferential treatment of Congress (during all but the New Deal 
years) with its consistently more critical review of state laws-a 
distinction the Lochner-era Justices understood very well. During 
their own and their parents' and grandparents' lifetimes, the states 
had amply demonstrated their unworthiness in protecting liberty. 100 
The people responded with the Reconstruction amendments, 
dramatically altering the nation's federalist structure by shifting 
power away from the states, and to Congress, to act as the ultimate 
guarantor of the freedoms, liberties, privileges, and immunities 
encompassed in those amendments. It was only natural, therefore, 
that the Lochner-era Court would review state laws with an 
especially critical (if sometimes clouded)IOJ eye, whereas it would 
be considerably more circumspect when reviewing acts of 
Congress. 
As Keith E. Whittington explains, part of the conventional 
Lochner story--of a Supreme Court running roughshod for forty 
years over an unwilling Congress-is simply inaccurate: 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Court's exercise of 
judicial review vis-a-vis Congress is how mundane it seems 
to have been. History remembers the highlights-the 
income tax cases, E. C. Knight, the child labor case-but 
this was but a small part of the Court's work and leaves a 
99. Id at 1455 ("The Progressives did not prevail overnight. It took many 
years on some issues. On a few it took the Depression and a threat to judicial 
independence. But it should come as little surprise that intense social 
disagreement with judicial decisions over a period of time increases the 
probability of seeing those judicial decisions changed. In that sense, intense 
social illegitimacy can lead to legal illegitimacy as well."). 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
101. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 59-65. 
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misleadin~ impression of how judicial reVIew was 
exercised. 02 
33 
To be sure, the Court likely exceeded its proper constitutional 
role during the New Deal years of 1934-1936, when it too 
obstinately butted heads with Congress and the Executive on major 
policy issues designed to pull the nation out of the Great 
Depression. When the Court "boldly str[ikes] down the preferred 
policies of a coordinate branch of the national government," and 
stands as "a countennajoritarian obstacle to progressive refonn," 
then we certainly "want to know how and why it behaved as such 
an 'extremely anomalous institution from a democratic point of 
view.",\03 Robert A. Dahl's comprehensive examination of the 
102. Whittington, supra note 51, at 856 ("The [phrase] 'Lochner era' implies 
a concerted assault on government power by a determined, conservative 
majority .... The Court at the turn of the twentieth century does not match those 
images. Its actions were informed by a coherent constitutional vision, but few 
of its decisions were of great political moment and the overall pattern does little 
to suggest an orchestrated campaign against the government. "). See also id at 
857-58 ("In toting up the gains and losses of judicial review, ... [Lochner] had 
little significance, mostly amounting to adjustments around the margins of 
politics." (citing MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS 153 (1999». 
103. Whittington, supra note 51, at 829 (quoting Robert A. Dahl, Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. 
PUB. L. 279, 291 (1957». On this reasoning, in light of the People's decision to 
amend the Constitution in 1868 through Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enable a democratically-accountable Congress to enforce Section 
One's citizenship, privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection 
clauses, and to the extent the New Deal legislation was predicated in part on 
Section Five, the Court acted inappropriately in striking down the legislation. A 
discussion of the scope of Congress' Section Five power is beyond the scope of 
this article; suffice it to say, the criticisms of the Lochner Court during the years 
1934-1936 apply at least equally today, with the Court's nullification of various 
Acts of Congress promulgated under its Section Five power with the goal of 
enforcing Section One freedoms. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000) (striking down Congress' abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
for federal age discrimination (equal protection) claims, on reasoning that 
Congress' Section Five authority to "enforce" does not extend to determining 
what constitutes a Section One violation); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). The Court 
may also be criticized, on the other hand, for giving too much respect to 
Congress and its commerce power and not enough to state sovereignty. See, 
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Court's entire history of invalidating federal statutes confirms, 
however, that "the New Deal was a historic outlier, a rare instance 
of the Court immediately bucking the major policies of a 
legislative majority."I04 Criticisms of the Lochner Court's 
decision-making during the New Deal years-particularly its 
invalidation of major federal laws-are justified, but they are 
empirically mistaken to extend the same charges to the years 
outside those of the New Deal. 
Dahl's research also suggests that throughout most of the 
nation's history, including during the remaining, non-New Deal 
years of the Lochner-era, "the Court addressed . . . policies of 
minor significance to lawmakers .... Far from exercising a power 
of absolute veto, the Court, like 'a powerful committee chairman in 
Congress,' could only 'determine important questions of timing, 
effectiveness, and subordinate policy. ",105 Moreover, "[ w ]hile the 
Court occasionally struck down provisions of politically important 
[federal] statutes or limited their scope with constitutional rules, the 
Court's exercise of judicial review during this period was usually 
routine, uncontroversial, and normatively unobjectionable.,,106 The 
Court's actions during these years arguably met the standard for 
social legitimacy enunciated by Professor Friedman,107 since "the 
invalidation of federal action rarely, if ever, pitted the Court 
against a clear majority of elected officials .... The Lochner Court 
worked hand-in-hand with the conservative political leaders in 
both parties to realize a common constitutional vision of limited 
government within a decentralized federal system.,,108 
e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I (2005) (holding that the application of a 
federal statute criminalizing the manufacture, distribution, or possession of 
marijuana to intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medical purposes did 
not violate the Commerce Clause). See also infra note 131. 
104. Whittington, supra note 51, at 826 (citing Dahl, supra note 103, at 291). 
See also id. at 827 n.30 (citing Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: 
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36 (1993) for 
the same proposition). 
105. Id. at 826-27 (quoting Dahl, supra note 103, at 294). 
106. Id at 823. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99. 
108. Whittington, supra note 51, at 823. Whittington illustrates empirically: 
"Between 1890 and 1919, the Supreme Court seriously entertained 
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In this sense, during all but the few New Deal years, the 
Lochner-era Court engaged in what Mark A. Graber might 
characterize as "constitutional dialogue" with its partner governing 
institutions, Congress and the Executive, "on crosscutting issues 
that internally divide the existing lawmaking majority,,,109 instead 
of merely "sustaining or rejecting the policies of the lawmaking 
majority.,,110 In so operating "within the interstices of national 
politics, [rather than] throwing itself against lawmaking 
majorities,,,111 the Court was able to assist the other branches in 
"resolv[ing] those political controversies that they cannot or would 
rather not address,,112 and, moreover, insulate judicial review from 
political challenge. 113 In short, from 1934-1936 the Lochner Court 
threw itself against lawmaking majorities, and its credibility long-
suffered as a result. 
III. THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY: A NEW "REASONABLE TIME, 
PLACE, AND MANNER" STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ALL 
RESTRICTIONS ON LIBERTY 
"As a practical matter," explains Randy E. Barnett, 
we must choose between two fundamentally different 
constructions of the Constitution, each resting on a 
different presumption. We either accept the presumption 
[ of liberty] that in pursuing happiness persons may do 
whatever is not justly prohibited or we are left with a 
presumption [of constitutionality] that the government may 
do whatever is not expressly prohibited.114 
constitutional challenges to federal statutes in at least 158 cases," striking down 
only twenty-three. Id. at 831. 
109. Graber, supra note 104, at 36. 
110. Whittington, supra note 51, at 827. 
111. Id. 
112. Graber, supra note 104, at 36. 
113. Whittington, supra note 51, at 827. 
114. BARNETT, supra note 29, at 268-69 ("The presence of the Ninth 
Amendment in the Constitution strongly supports the first of these two 
presumptions. The Constitution established what Steven Macedo has called 
islands of governmental powers 'surrounded by a sea of individual rights.' It 
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Which of these jurisprudential approaches-the presumption of 
constitutionality, or the presumption of liberty-is most faithful 1 15 
to the constitutional design? To begin, we might rephrase the 
question to: What was the single overarching purpose-the one 
guiding principle that precedes and trumps all else-behind the 
founding of the nation, as expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence and guaranteed in the Constitution? Stated yet 
another way: Details aside, what was the single irreducible Big 
Idea that prompted the founding and framing? If it is possible to 
so reduce the founding and framing to one single transcendent 
principle of "America-as-Ideal," what would it be? 
did not establish 'islands [of rights] surrounded by a sea of governmental 
powers.'" (quoting STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT v. THE CONSTITUTION 
97 (1987»). See also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM 
L. REv. 1365, 1417-18 (1997) ("The burden for those who would discriminate 
[or invade a right] is to demonstrate a sufficiently strong [justification] .... If 
the justification rests on what people think is undebtable, the justification is 
relatively strong. If the justification rests on what people think is debtable, or 
contested ... , then the justification is relatively weak. ... Contestation tilts to 
the default, and the default is active support of the right [and non-
discrimination]. "). 
115. As Thomas Paine explained, constitutional fidelity is important because 
it establishes the immutable rules by which the game is played: 
A Constitution is a thing antecedent to a Government, and a 
Government is only the creature of a Constitution .... [I]f experience 
should hereafter show that alterations, amendments, or additions are 
necessary, the Constitution will point out the mode by which such 
things shall be done, and not leave it to the discretionary power of the 
future Government .... 
A Government ... cannot have the right of altering itself. If it had, it 
would be arbitrary. It might make itself what it pleased; and wherever 
such a right is set up, it shows there is no Constitution. 
THoMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (1791) [hereinafter RIGHTS OF MAN], reprinted in 
COMMON SENSE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, AND OTHER ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS PAINE 129, 175 (2003) [hereinafter ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF PAINE]. See 
also BARNETT, supra note 29, at 103 (''The Constitution is a law designed to 
restrict the lawmakers. . . . In particular, it is put in writing so these [political] 
actors cannot themselves make the laws by which they make law."). 
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A. Foundations 
Once we engage in the interpretive taskl16 and carefully 
consider the possible answers to these questions, we are ultimately 
left with only one acceptable answer: the single irreducible value 
eclipsing all else under the American constitutional regime IS 
LibertylFreedom. Eric Foner explains: 
No idea is more fundamental to Americans' sense of 
themselves as individuals and as a nation than . . . 
"freedom"---Qr "liberty," with which it is almost always 
used interchangeably .... The Declaration of Independence 
lists liberty among mankind's inalienable rights; the 
Constitution announces as its purpose to secure liberty's 
blessings. . . . If asked to explain or justify their actions, 
public or private, Americans are likely to respond, "It's a 
free country." "Every man in the street, white, black, red or 
yellow," wrote the educator and statesman Ralph Bunche in 
1940, "knows that this is 'the land of the free' ... 'the cradle 
ofliberty. ",117 
116. Historians and constitutional theorists make interesting careers debating 
how to interpret the Founding documents. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBm, THE 
MODALITIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
12-22 (1991) (suggesting a judge's approach must incorporate either a historical, 
textual, doctrinal, structural, ethical, or prudential modalities, or some combination 
thereof: "There is no constitutional legal argument outside of these modalities. 
Outside these forms a proposition about the US Constitution can be a fact, or be 
elegant, or be amusing or even poetic, and although such assessments exist as 
legal statements in some possible legal world, they are not actualized in our 
legal world."). See also Lessig, supra note 114, at 13 71, 1379 (analogizing 
interpretation as a sort of translation of text from one language (or era) to text in 
another: "If the translation succeeds-if it is a good translation-then there is an 
important relation between the two texts, in these two contexts: naively put, their 
'meaning' is to be 'the same.' Different texts, different contexts; same 
meaning."). 
117. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM xiii (1998). See a/so, 
e.g., GASPAR G. BACON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 96 (2d ed. 
1971) (1928) ("The recognition and preservation of the liberties of the 
individual citizen by specific limitations upon the power of government is one of 
the essential characteristics of the Constitution. . . . This ideal [of personal 
liberty] is today the birthright of every American. It is a fundamental part of our 
charter of government; it can be impaired only if the people themselves, of their 
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own free will choose to relinquish [through constitutional amendment] their 
inalienable rights. It is the protection of the humblest individual against his own 
government; it is our bulwark against autocratic power, and against the impulses 
of an irresponsible majority."). 
A simple thought experiment illustrates the point: Imagine the ubiquitous 
multiple choice test where we must select the single best response to the 
question, "What is the single, irreducible ideal underlying America's Founding 
as embraced in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution?" from the 
following list of choices: "Democracy"; "Equality"; "LibertylFreedom'" or 
"Property." The single best response is "LibertylFreedom." The constitutional 
preamble gives the first clue, since "Liberty" is the only one of the choices 
explicitly named. u.s. CONST. PREAMBLE ("We the People of the United States, 
in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America." (emphasis added». 
Regarding Property, although there is no question a major purpose of the 
Constitution was to protect economic interests (see generally, e.g., CHARLES A. 
BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1913», few would suggest Property should prevail over (at least) 
Democracy or LibertylFreedom. 
As between LibertylFreedom and Equality, LibertylFreedom would prevail. 
As protected through the Bill of Rights (selectively incorporated to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process "Liberty" Clause), and the 
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, LibertylFreedom actually encompasses 
Equality within its broad scope, so in fact we need not sacrifice Equality at all; 
whereas the converse is not true: Equality, as protected within the Fifth (due 
process), Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, does not incorporate 
LibertylFreedom within its bounds even when broadly defined. See also Trevor 
W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner's Loss: Randy Barnett's Case for a 
Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 839,870-71 (2005), pointing out 
a "liberty-equality connection" in the Court's modern substantive due process 
doctrine: 
Indeed, certain of the Court's substantive due process decisions-Roe, 
for example-are probably best justified on both equality and liberty 
grounds. The freedom to make personal decisions about one's body 
and one's intimate associations helps secure one's status as an 
empowered, equal member of society. Put simply, equality is promoted 
by the protection of the liberties associated with procreative autonomy, 
bodily integrity, and intimate association. 
(footnotes omitted). Distinguishing Randy Barnett's interpretation of Lawrence 
v. Texas, see infra note 137, Morrison continues, 
Lawrence is best understood as according special attention to liberty-
based claims that also seek to promote equality. And in that respect, 
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Historian Bernard Bailyn reports that the most basic goals of 
the American Revolutionary Era were to "free the individual from 
the oPRressive misuse of power, [and] from the tyranny of the 
state." 18 As Thomas Jefferson said in 1774, "[K]ings [are] 'the 
Lawrence highlights a liberty-equality connection implicit in much of 
the Court's work. By focusing on that connection, we may be able to 
pursue a jurisprudence of liberty that, unlike Professor Barnett's 
libertarian account, is both grounded in existing constitutional doctrine 
and tailored to the freedoms that the modem Court seems most inclined 
to protect. 
Id. at 571. 
The choice between LibertylFreedom and Democracy is tougher, since the 
question, as posed, is a zero-sum game, and both values are well-established in the 
Constitution. Democracy, though, is not so well established as LibertylFreedom. 
See generally, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2007) (discussing numerous ways in which the Constitution mandates and 
maintains undemocratic processes); Brown, supra note 11, at 556 ("[The] 
presumption that majority rule is the starting point of inquiry ... is not justified by 
the text of the Constitution, nor has it been justified by extrinsic theoretical 
arguments. Majority rule has a place under the Constitution, but that document 
does not purport to elevate the popular will to a position of even presumptive 
primacy. Indeed, popular political will is a force to be tempered at every tum." 
(footnotes omitted)). Even assuming arguendo the constitutional grounding of the 
two values are precisely "equal," certainly most Americans would elect to save 
LibertylFreedom if forced to choose between the two (i.e., in a theoretical world, 
"would we forever sacrifice LibertylFreedom if we could forever maintain 
Democracy?"; versus, ''would we forever sacrifice Democracy if we could forever 
maintain LibertylFreedom?"}-it is almost inconceivable to imagine that many 
Americans, then or now, would elect to live in servitude with a vote, rather than to 
live free without a vote. 
To metaphorically conceptualize this interpretive task squarely in the present 
day, imagine the "Google Earth®" feature ofthe popular internet search engine, 
where written answers to basic constitutional questions may be viewed in 
greater detail by zooming in closer to the document, and in broader, less-detailed 
form by zooming out. Zooming out to view the contours of our question, "What 
single value does the Constitution stand for?," from the widest possible angle, 
where all detail has been lost leaving only one answer to the question, the 
answer would read, "LibertylFreedom." Zooming in, we could next read, ''to 
free the individual from the oppressive misuse of power, [and] from the tyranny 
of the state," then "Equality," "Democracy," "Property," and so on. See infra 
text accompanying note 118. 
118. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION v-vi (enl. ed. 1992). 
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servants and not the proprietors of the people. ",119 Thomas Paine 
captured this understanding of the superior natural relationship of 
the people to their government in two enormously influential 
pamphlets, Common Sense in 1776 and Rights of Man in 1791-
1794,120 stating, "Society in every state is a blessing, but 
government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its 
worst state an intolerable one .... Government, like dress, is the 
badge oflost innocence .... ,,121 
119. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
168 (1993) ("Government was [in Revolutionary America] being widely 
pictured as merely a legal man-made contrivance having little if any natural 
relationship to the family or to society." Id. at 167). 
120. Thomas Paine's philosophy "inspired two of the greatest revolutions in 
human history-the American Revolution and the French Revolution." Sidney 
Hook, Introduction to ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF PAINE, supra note 115, at xix. 
Common Sense created a sensation. It was "the January heat of 1776 that 
balanced the July light of Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence." 
Jack Fruchtman, Jr., Foreword to ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF PAINE, supra note 
115, at x. "George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and many others praised it .. 
. . It might even be said that while Jefferson's abstract diction justified rebellion, 
Paine's explosive words got rebel men and muskets into the field." Id. "But not 
everyone agreed. Common Sense argued for American independence, just as 
Rush, Franklin, and Sam Adams desired. But it did so in such charged language 
that some American leaders thought went too far." Id. at ix-x. Rights of Man, 
which was actually addressed in withering response to Paine's former close 
friend and confidant Edmund Burke's (whom Paine had earlier labeled "a friend 
of mankind" for his support of the American revolution) condemnation of the 
French Revolution in Reflections on the Revolution in France, rebutted Burke's 
stodgy "defen[se] [of] tradition, church and aristocracy ... with the weapons of 
innovation, free thought, and democracy." Id. at xi. 
121. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF 
PAINE, supra note 115, at 1. Paine continues, 
In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end of 
government, let us suppose a small number of persons settled in some 
sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the rest, they well then 
represent the first peopling of any country, or of the world. In this state 
of natural liberty, society will be their first thought. A thousand 
motives will excite them thereto, the strength of one man is so unequal 
to his wants, and his mind so unfitted for perpetual solitude, that he is 
soon obliged to seek assistance and relief of another, who in his turn 
requires the same .... 
Thus necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newly 
arrived emigrants into society, the reciprocal blessings of which, would 
supersede, and render the obligations of law and government 
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Paine adds, "Man did not enter into society to become worse 
than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, 
but to have those rights better secured.,,122 Paine explains the 
circumstances under which man cedes some of his natural rights to 
the care of society and government as "civil" rights: "The natural 
rights which are not retained, are all those in which, though the 
right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them IS 
defective.,,123 Indeed, he states: 
[N]atural rights are the foundation of all his civil rights ... 
[and include] all the intellectual rights, or rights of the 
mind, and also all those rights of acting as an individual for 
his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to 
the natural rights of others. Civil rights are those which 
appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. 
Every civil right has for its foundation some natural right 
pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of 
which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently 
competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to 
security and protection . 
. . . He therefore deposits this right in the common stock 
of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a 
part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society 
grants him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in society, 
and draws on the capital as a matter of right." I 24 
unnecessary while they remained perfectly just to each other; but as 
nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably happen, 
that . . . they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each 
other; and this remissness will point out the necessity of establishing 
some form of government to supply the defect of moral virtue. 
Id. at 2, 5. "[O]n this [model]," Paine concludes, "depends the strength of 
government, and the happiness of the governed." Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
122. RIGHTS OF MAN, in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF PAINE, supra note 115, at 
168. 
123. Id. at 170. 
124. Id. at 168-70. For a modern perspective on these ideas, see, for 
example, CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LmERTY: AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 
71-72,76-77 (2007): 
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By contrast, Paine explains, "The natural rights which he 
retains are all those in which the ~ower to execute it is as perfect in 
the individual as the right itself." 25 
These ideals are echoed throughout the official and unofficial 
writings of the key framers as well. To give just a few examples, 
James Madison says, in The Federalist No. 51, "If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government 
would be necessary.,,126 In No. 15, Alexander Hamilton describes 
"[t]he great and radical vice" of the existing Articles of 
Confederation: "the principle of legislation for states . . . in their 
corporate or collective capacities, ... as contradistinguished from 
the individuals of which they consist.,,127 And Madison again, 
discussing in No. 37 the reconciliation of liberty and government 
through the mechanism of representatives' electoral accountability 
to the people: "The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on 
one side not only that all power should be derived from the people, 
It is generally thought that we must have the state for enforcement, 
legislation, and adjudication, and [therefore rights must be merely] 
creatures of the state. But ... [i]t is entirely plausible to argue that we 
have the rights whether or not they are enforced, embodied in codes, or 
officially adjudicated .... Our rights- ... in their broad outlines-are 
the entailments of what we are: free and reasoning persons, capable ofa 
conception of what is good and right .... It is because our rights flow 
from who and what we are that we may form, re-form, or accept 
[government] in order to make our rights more certain and secure. So 
those who say that our rights depend on or are the creatures of states 
have it the wrong way around. 
. . . The state is rather nothing but a web of relations between 
individuals as individuals, whose choices are coordinated according to 
what they understand is possible for them and what they mayor may 
not do .... [That is, i]f states are the greatest violators of liberty, they 
are also its greatest enablers and protectors. In any advanced condition 
of civilization there can be no effective degree of liberty without the 
state, because there can be no effective degree ofliberty without law. 
125. RIGHTS OF MAN, in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF PAINE, supra note 115, at 170. 
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 51. 
127. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (emphasis added). 
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but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the 
people by a short duration of their appointments .... ,,)28 
Some nearly four-score years later, Abraham Lincoln 
expressed his understandings of these liberty/freedom-first 
principles as well: 
[The founders] meant to set up a standard maxim for free 
society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; 
constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even 
though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, 
and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its 
128. THE FEDERALIST No.3 7 (emphasis added). For further examples of The 
Federalist characterizing liberty as an underlying American ideal, see Contents 
of THE FEDERALIST xix, xx-xxxi (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961): In No. 14, 
answering objections regarding the extent of the Union, James Madison "gets in 
a few more stout blows for federalism and republicanism as agencies of freedom 
.... " Id. at xxi (emphasis added). In No. 16, Hamilton continues "with his 
argument for a government with 'the power of extending its operations to 
individuals,' and warns that failure to institute such a government will abandon 
America to anarchy, war, despotism, and death." /d. (emphasis added). In No. 
20, Hamilton and Madison describe "the calamities that have befallen the 
Netherlands because of adherence to the false principle of 'a sovereignty over 
sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as 
contradistinguished from individuals.'" Id. at xxi-xxii (emphasis added). In 
No. 27, Hamilton makes "[f]urther observations on the necessity of a national 
government with authority to legislate for individuals." Id. at xxiii (emphasis 
added). In No. 47, Madison "instruct[s] his readers ['in favor of liberty'] in the 
true meaning of 'the political maxim that the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
departments ought to be separate and distinct. '" Id. at xxvi. In No. 48, Madison 
begins his "praise of checks and balances by insisting that 'parchment barriers' 
are not enough to prevent the 'tyrannical concentration of all the powers of 
government in the same hands, '" to the detriment of individual liberty. Id. In 
No. 51, Madison "finds 'security for civil rights,' not in charters or in appeals to 
humanity, but in 'the mUltiplicity of interests' that characterizes a free society." 
Id. (emphasis added). In No. 62, Madison, making a strong case for the 
principle of legislative bicameralism, "[w]ith candor and eloquence ... salutes 
the joys [specifically, individual freedom] of ordered society and stable 
government." /d. at xxviii. In No. 63, Madison continues on that theme, finding 
in bicameralism '''a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and 
delusions,' ... [and] arguing 'the necessity of some institution that will blend 
stability with liberty. '" /d. (emphasis added). Finally, in No. 78, Hamilton 
comments, "Whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will 
be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter['s protections of 
individual rights, among others] and disregard the former." Id. at xxx-xxxi. 
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influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life 
to all people of all colors everywhere .... They knew the 
proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants, and they meant 
when such should re-appear in this fair land and commence 
their vocation the~ should find left for them at least one 
hard nut to crack. 1 9 
In short, in America, government is Liberty's servant. 
Government-and democracy itself--exists only to protect 
Liberty,130 with the Constitution serving as the bulwark against 
inevitable government attempts toward overreaching. l3l The 
framers understood full well that men are not angels132 and that 
power has the overwhelming tendency to corrupt,133 so they 
129. Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, 
Illinois (June 26, 1857), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 
1832-1858, at 390,398-99 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). 
130. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 4, at 18-19 ("Elections ... 'are a crucial 
device for controlling leaders. '" (quoting Professor Robert A. Dahl)); Brown, 
supra note 11, at 571, 535 ("[Democratic] [a ]ccountability is a structural notion 
of blame whose final cause is liberty"; "accountability is best understood ... as 
a structural feature of the constitutional architecture, the goal of which is to 
protect liberty. In this respect it is much like the other structural constitutional 
features such as separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism-all 
of which are more comfortably accepted as devices for protecting individual 
rights. "). 
131. The enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction amendments 
(primarily Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment) provide ample 
constitutional authority for Congress to enact progressive legislation (though 
ironically this is an area in which the current Supreme Court fails to give proper 
deference to Congress, see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). 
132. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
133. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 118, at 60 ("[T]he point [writers of the 
Revolutionary era] hammered home time and again, and agreed on-
freethinking Anglican literati no less than neo-Calvinist theologians-was the 
incapacity of the species, of mankind in general, to withstand the temptations of 
power. Such is 'the depravity of mankind,' Samuel Adams, speaking for the 
Boston Town Meeting, declared, 'that ambition and lust of power above the law 
are . . . predominant passions in the breasts of most men.' . . . Power . . . 
'converts a good man in private life to a tyrant in office.' It acts upon men like 
drink: it 'is known to be intoxicating in its nature'-'too intoxicating and liable 
to abuse.' And nothing within man is sufficiently strong to guard against these 
effects of power---certainly not 'the united considerations of reason and 
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constructed a limited government of separated powers with the 
ultimate power reserved to the people l34 to operate within their 
own self-imposed constitutional constraints. 135 
religion,' for they have never 'been sufficiently powerful to restrain these lusts 
of men. '" (citing Eliot, sermon (JHL 15), pp. 10-11, etc.)). 
134. The Tenth Amendment provides, "The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis 
added). In other words, to the limited extent power exists in government, it is 
divided among the national and state governments; and the people have the great 
residual power. See, e.g., ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, LmERTY FOR ALL 14-15 
(2006) ("Taking the Ninth and Tenth Amendments together, ... [we see that] 
the principal idea of American law at both the state and federal level ... is that 
the people are sovereign and that any powers not ceded to government (whether 
federal or state) remain in the possession of individual citizens. There is thus a 
strong presumption in favor of individual liberty that may be rebutted if the 
govemment can establish a clearly defined power to act. The default position, in 
other words, is that 'the claimant of governmental power must show title to it' 
and, ifnot, individual liberty prevails." (citing EDWARD INGERSOLL, PERSONAL 
LIBERTY & MARTIAL LAW: A REVIEW OF SOME PAMPHLETS OF THE DAY 24 
(1862); JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 752 (1833))). 
135. Jeremy Waldron identifies a "precommitment model" for "reconcil[ing] 
the ideal of democratic self-government with our system of constitutional 
constraint." Jeremy Waldron, The 1999 Hartman Hotz Lecture Banking 
Constitutional Rights: Who Controls Withdrawals?, 52 ARK. L. REv. 533, 538, 
547 (1999). Just as a compulsive gambler may establish an ATM withdrawal 
limit with his bank to prevent him from withdrawing money against his better 
judgment once in the heat of the moment at the casino; 
a chronic over-sleeper with a weakness for the "snooze" button may 
place his alarm clock out of reach on the other side of the bedroom; a 
smoker may hide his cigarettes; and a heavy drinker may give his car 
keys to a friend at the beginning of a party with strict instructions not to 
return them when they are requested at midnight. 
Id. at 539. Waldron continues, 
So, similarly, it may be said, a whole people may decide collectively 
to bind themselves in advance to resist the siren charms of rights-
violations. Aware, as much as the gambler, of the temptations of 
wrong or irrational action, the people as a whole in a lucid moment 
may put themselves under certain constitutional disabilities-
disabilities which serve the same function in relation to democratic 
values as are served by ATM withdrawal limits in relation to the 
gambler'S autonomy . . . . The mechanisms [the gamblers and the 
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My point is simply this: The most important, influential 
writings and commentaries of the American founding and 
reconstruction eras extol the virtues of freedom, not of government 
power to limit freedom. By contrast, we do not find any serious 
argument in these writings for the sort of overly powerful 
government that we have today in America.136 Nothing in the 
Constitution mandates such an extreme level of judicial deference 
to government as currently exists. The point is that presumption-
of-constitutionality review is ill-advised in the sense that it offers 
government too much temptation and leeway to act in ways that 
infringe upon LibertylFreedom, which, as we have seen, 
constitutes the very core ideal upon which the nation was founded 
and the Constitution is designed to protect. Accordingly, the U.S. 
Supreme Court should replace its current presumption-of-
constitutionality standard of review with a presumption-of-liberty 
others] adopt enable them to secure the good that they really want and 
avoid the evil which, occasionally despite themselves, they really want 
to avoid. Similarly, the people do not really want to restrict free 
speech, abridge press freedom, or set up an established church. They 
are aware, however, that on occasion they may be panicked into doing 
something like this. So they take precautions in advance, instituting 
legal constraints as safeguards to prevent them from doing in a moment 
of fever what in their cooler, more thoughtful moments they are sure 
they do not want to do .... 
. . . As in the case of our gambler, we acknowledge the existence of 
constraint at the moment when the decision in question is being made: 
the people or their legislative representatives will feel limited and 
frustrated when the courts strike down their enactments. It will seem to 
them at the moment as though they are not really their own masters. 
But when they reflect on how we came to have a constitution, they will 
understand these constraints as an aspect of their self-mastery, not as a 
derogation of it. 
Id. at 540-43 (emphasis in original). 
136. See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 134, at 32 ("[M]odem constitutional 
jurisprudence turns the original constitutional structure on its head, placing the 
burden on citizens to convince the courts that laws restricting liberty are 
'irrational.' ... The slow, steady, and silent subversion of the Constitution has 
been a revolution that Americans appear to have slept through unaware that the 
blessings of liberty bestowed upon them by the founding generation were being 
eroded."). 
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standard for all governmental restrictions on individual liberty 
interests. 137 
B. Existing Applications of the "Reasonable Time, Place, and 
Manner" Standard 
If one accepts this essay's assertion that the Constitution 
requires a presumption-of-liberty standard of judicial review for all 
government restrictions on (broadly defined) liberty interests, the 
next question is how (absent a resurrection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause to its rightful 
statuS)138 such a standard could be effectuated, in practical terms. 
Happily, a useful normative model for a more Liberty-friendly 
standard of review already exists. The one area where the Court 
currently does apply a liberty-first approach is in its First 
Amendment speech doctrine, where government restrictions on 
speech (as per se burdens on a protected liberty interest)139 are 
presumed unconstitutional and subject either to strict scrutiny 
137. The Court occasionally recognizes the proper scope of LibertylFreedom, 
notwithstanding the presumption-of-constitutionality doctrine. In Lawrence v. 
Texas, for example, the Court stated, "Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. 
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct." 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (repudiating the 
exceedingly cramped view of liberty earlier recognized in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986)). See also BARNETT, supra note 29, at 334 ("Justice 
Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence is especially noteworthy because it protects 
liberty, rather than privacy, without any discussion of whether that liberty was 
'fundamental.' Having identified the conduct as liberty (not license), it then 
placed the burden on the government to justify its restriction. In this way, 
Lawrence can be viewed as escaping the Footnote Four-Plus framework [see 
supra note 41] and employing in its place a Presumption of Liberty."); supra 
note 116 for assertion of Lawrence's "liberty-equality connection." 
138. See generally Lawrence, supra note 21. 
139. The First Amendment protects speech, a liberty interest incorporated to 
apply to states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Gitlow 
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Twenty of the twenty-five distinct 
provisions contained within the Bill of Rights have been incorporated to apply to 
the states through the Due Process Clause in similar fashion. See, e.g., 
Lawrence, supra note 21, at 44. Federal restrictions on speech are 
presumptively invalid under the First Amendment (by its terms) and the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. 
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review (if the. restriction is content-based),140 or intermediate 
scrutiny review (if the restriction is content-neutral). 141 
With the latter, the Court has held that the government may 
meet its burden if its particular speech-limiting action constitutes a 
"reasonable time, place, and manner restriction." As the Court 
states in Clark v . . Community for Creative Non- Violence, 142 for 
example, 
We have often noted that [time, place, and manner] 
restrictions of this kind are valid provided they are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the 
information. 143 
This last requirement is crucial: outright prohibitions on the 
speech liberty interest are never "reasonable"-the restriction must 
leave open alternative times or places for its exercise. 144 
140. See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 
U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the 
Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress 
unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion 
rather than persuasion. "). 
141. !d. at 642 ("[R ]egulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are 
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny because in most cases they pose a 
less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public 
dialogue." (citation omitted)). As an initial matter, the Court asks if the conduct 
at issue is sufficiently "expressive" to merit even any form of First Amendment 
protection. Id. at 641-43. 
142. 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding, as a reasonable time, place, and 
manner restriction, Park Service's denial of a permit for protesters to sleep 
overnight in symbolic tent city). 
143. Id. at 293-94. See also, e.g., Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding a regulation requiring a 
religious organization seeking to distribute literature at a state fair to do so only 
from an assigned location); City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 
(1983); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Consol. Edison v. Pub. 
Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, (1980); Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 1090--92 (surveying Hill V. Colorado, 
530 U.S. 703 (2000); Schenck V. Pro-Choice Network ofW. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 
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Looking beyond the First Amendment, it is conceptually 
possible to extend the reasonable time, place, and manner analysis 
to other liberty interests. In fact one federal court, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, has already done so. In Lutz v. City of 
York,145 the Third Circuit found a constitutional right of intrastate 
travel in the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
doctrine and then applied a time, place, and manner analysis to 
determine whether a local ban on "cruising" violated that liberty 
interest. Noting that enumerated speech liberty interests protected 
by the First Amendment are sometimes subject to less-than-full 
strict scrutiny under the Court's time, place, and manner approach, 
the Third Circuit concluded, "if the freedom of speech itself can be 
so qualified, then surely the unenumerated right of localized travel 
can be as well.,,146 
The Third Circuit reasoned: 
The concerns underlying York's cruising ordinance seem to 
us highly analogous to the concerns that drive the time, 
place and manner doctrine: just as the right to speak cannot 
conceivably imply the right to speak whenever, wherever 
and however one pleases--even in public fora specifically· 
used for public speech-so too the right to travel cannot 
conceivably imply the right to travel whenever, wherever 
(1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Clark v. Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 
U.S. 171 (1983); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648; Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
(1972); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 
77 (1949)). But see City of Erie v. PAP's AM, 529 U.S. 277, 317-18 (2000) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating, in response to the plurality upholding a ban on 
nude dancing, "For the first time, the Court has now held that such [secondary] 
effects may justify the total suppression of protected speech."). 
145. 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990). 
146. Id at 269. The court noted the inapplicability of the "content-neutrality" 
criterion outside of the First Amendment context, commenting, 
The requirement of content-neutrality in the speech context has no 
obvious analog in the travel context . . . . Because we can discern no 
invidious distinctions among travelers in the cruising ordinance, we 
find its restrictions on travel more closely analogous to a content-
neutral, not a content-specific, restriction on speech in a public forum. 
Id. at 270 n.40. 
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and however one pleases--even on roads specifically 
designed for public travel. Unlimited access to public fora 
or roadways would result not in maximizing individuals' 
opportunity to engage in protected activity, but chaos. To 
prevent that, state and local governments must enjoy some 
degree of flexibility to regulate access to, and use of, the 
publicly held instrumentalities of speech and travel. 
Therefore, in order to set out a workable jurisprudence for 
the newly recognized due process right of localized 
movement on the public roadways, we find it appropriate to 
borrow from the well-settled, highly analogous rules the 
Court has developed in the free speech context. The 
cruising ordinance will be subjected to intermediate 
scrutiny, and will be upheld if it is narrowly tailored to 
meet significant city objectives. 147 
In applying the well-recognized and -accepted time, place, and 
manner doctrine for the first time to liberty interests beyond the 
First Amendment, Lutz provides an excellent practical framework 
for extending a heightened scrutiny standard of review to 
governmental restrictions on all asserted liberty interests. As 
discussed below, this would be a positive development, as the 
time, place, and manner standard more accurately reflects the 
Constitution's core Liberty-first ideals, while also recognizing the 
proper constitutional governmental role in maintaining law and 
order. 
C. Broadening the Scope of the Standard to Cover All Liberty 
Interests 
This essay argues that the "reasonable time, place, and 
manner" approach of the sort employed by the Supreme Court to 
review restrictions on First Amendment speech liberty interests 
and by the Third Circuit in Lutz to review restrictions on 
Fourteenth Amendment intrastate travel liberty interests should be 
extended to apply to restrictions on all asserted liberty interests. 148 
147. /d. at 269-70 (footnotes omitted). 
148. See also BARNETI, supra note 29, at 325 ("Like the modem doctrine 
that views content-neutral 'time, place, and manner' regulations of speech to be 
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The aJ'proach is not a perfect fit and wrinkles need to be ironed 
out,14 but it offers an excellent practical mechanism to move us 
well down the road toward judicial recognition of a more proper 
balance between individual liberty interests and government 
power. 
1. Virtues 
The virtues of adopting the reasonable time, place, and manner 
standard of review for all restrictions on asserted liberty interests 
are significant. Most obviously, it reestablishes the proper 
elevated posture of individual liberty, as broadly defined, vis-a-vis 
government power, whereby government must explain to the 
individual when it restricts the person's liberty rather than require 
the person to approach the government hat-in-hand to redeem the 
liberty that is rightly hers in the first place. While the new 
standard would be much more protective of liberty interests,150 it 
should be emphasized that many restrictions regulating liberty 
interests will be upheld as reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions. l5J As with the Court's First Amendment doctrine, 
consistent with the First Amendment, the police power permits the states the 
authority 'to make extensive and varied regulations as to the time, place, and 
circumstances in and under which parties shall assert, enjoy, or exercise their 
rights, without coming into conflict with any of those constitutional principles 
which are established for the protection of private rights or private property. '" 
(quoting COOLEY, supra note 54, at 597». 
149. The current "fundamental rights" designation should be retained for 
those liberty interests (previously and as yet) recognized as deserving of the 
highest degree of protection from government interference (strict scrutiny). 
Absent retention of the existing fundamental rights regime in some form, the 
new "reasonable time, place, and manner" approach (essentially a form of 
intermediate scrutiny) would have the undesired effect of actually lessening the 
degree of protection for the liberty interests currently designated as 
"fundamental rights," which currently receive strict scrutiny protection. 
150. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. 
151. See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 
TEX. L. REv. 1, 14 (2006) (stating, in a related context, "This [individual natural 
rights] model [of the Ninth Amendment] does not exclude the regulation of 
natural rights, any more than an individual natural rights model of the First 
HeinOnline -- 68 La. L. Rev. 52 2007-2008
52 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
outright prohibitions of the liberty interest will, however, never be 
acceptable. 152 
Moreover, from a jurisprudential standpoint, applying the 
reasonable time, place, and manner approach to all asserted liberty 
interests addresses the countermajoritarian difficulty created when 
unelected judges strike down some, but not other, acts of the 
democratically elected branches of government. 153 To illustrate, 
consider first Robert Bork' s discussion of the proper exercise of 
judicial review: 
[T]he Court must not be merely a "naked power organ," 
which means that its decisions must be controlled by 
principle .... 
The requirement that the Court be principled arises from 
the resolution of the seeming anomaly of judicial 
supremacy in a democratic society. If the judiciary really is 
supreme, able to rule when and as it sees fit, the society is 
not democratic .... 
. . . [Our Constitution] has also a counter-majoritarian 
premise, however, for it assumes there are some areas of 
life a majority should not control. There are some things a 
majority should not do to us no matter how democratically 
it decides to do them. These are areas properly left to 
individual freedom, and coercion by the majority in these 
aspects of life is tyranny .... 
. . . Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within 
defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to be 
stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the 
Constitution. 
But this resolution of the dilemma imposes severe 
requirements upon the Court. For it follows that the 
Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can 
demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, 
Amendment excludes all time, place, or manner regulations of speech, press, or 
assembly."}. 
152. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text. 
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derived from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of 
majority and minority freedom. If it does not have such a 
theory but merely imposes its own value choices, or worse 
if it pretends to have a theory but actually follows its own 
predilections, the Court violates the postulates of the 
Madisonian model that alone justifies its power. 
This is, I think, the ultimate reason the Court must be 
principled. If it does not have and rigorously adhere to a 
valid and consistent theory of majority and minority 
freedoms based upon the Constitution, judicial supremacy, 
given the axioms of our system, is, precisely to that extent, 
illegitimate. 154 
53 
By removing the Court's discretion under its current 
substantive due process doctrine to handpick which liberty 
interests are sufficiently "fundamental" to trigger heightened 
scrutiny,155 this essay's proposal to subject restrictions on all 
154. Bork, supra note 51, at 2-4 ("A principled decision ... is one that rests 
on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their 
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved." 
(quoting HERBERT WECHSLER, Toward Principles of Constitutional Law, in 
PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 27 (1961))). See also 
McConnell, supra note 3, at 1273 ("[fhe] more modest view of constitutional 
judicial review is that the constitution is not designed to produce the one 'best 
answer' to all questions, but to establish a framework for representative 
government .... The job of the judge is to ensure that representative institutions 
conform to the commitments made by the people in the past, and embodied in 
text, history, tradition, and precedent."). 
155. Robert Bork is arguably correct in describing the Court's current 
substantive due as technically unprincipled. See generally Bork, supra note 51. 
The Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, where the Court is forced to 
pick and choose from among particular "rights" according to its own value 
system (whether based on the Justices' own individual understandings of 
"original intent," "tradition," "neutrality," personal predilections, or other 
criteria), lacks adequate moorings. To some, liberty may be the freedom to 
make end-of-life decisions free of government interference, or to have sex with 
whomever they choose on whatever terms they may arrange (economic or 
otherwise), or to smoke marijuana free of threat of imprisonment by the 
government, see infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text; to others liberty 
may be the freedom to engage in certain economic transactions or to pursue a 
livelihood of one's choosing-and never the twain shall they meet. This 
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liberty interests to heightened time, place, and manner scrutiny156 
offers a principled approach of judicial restraint, though of a 
different sort thim that championed by Holmes, Frankfurter, Hand, 
et aI., who elevate majoritarian democracy above Liberty itself; or 
of Robert Bork himself, Antonin Scalia, and others with 
excessively cramped views of Liberty. The proposed approach is, 
rather, more in keeping with the principles of Paine, Hamilton, 
Madison, Jefferson, Lincoln, and others with expansive views of 
LibertylFreedom, who understand the perils of leaving the 
People's liberties to the whims of elected majorities. 
No longer may the Court be accused of acting as a 
"superlegislature"; 157 rather, the new approach enforces 
constitutional Liberty-First dictates in a more even-handed, almost 
ministerial sense. The Constitution itself makes those value 
choices for the Court, and requires it to nullify those legislative 
and executive acts that excessively restrict the core constitutional 
value of individual LibertylFreedom (as also encompassing 
Equality). 158 As Chief Justice Roberts said it in his confirmation 
hearings, "I don't think the Court should be a taskmaster of 
Congress. The Constitution is the Court's taskmaster, and it is 
Congress' as well.,,159 
approach is rightly criticized. Liberty should not be left to a regime that rewards 
special protection to those who are able to shout the loudest or to spend enough 
money to elect their candidates or place their judges in positions of prominence. 
It is important to note, though, that economic liberty interests, while protected to 
a degree under the new approach, are less protected than other individual liberty 
interests. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 124, at 154 ("[U]nlike liberty of the mind 
and sex, property is not a natural right .... "). 
156. See infra note 164 (stating that existing (and future) fundamental rights 
still receive strict scrutiny review). 
157. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees ofUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 384 
(2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[C]ourts, do not '''sit as a superlegislature to 
judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations" (quoting 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 
303 (1976))); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) ("We refuse to sit 
as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation'" (quoting Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952))). 
158. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
159. Linda Greenhouse, In Roberts Hearing, Specter Assails Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, September 15, 2005. 
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Once we accept this essay's proposition that the genuine 
Constitution was premised upon an expansive view of Freedom 
vis-ii-vis government power, and mandates broad protections of 
individual Liberty, we see how the notion of "special" protections 
falls away. The fact that "[t]he Constitution has little to say about 
contract [and] less about abortion," as John Hart Ely put it, is 
simply irrelevant: all liberty interests--enumerated and 
unenumerated-are protected. 160 
2. Applying the Standard 
How would the new "reasonable time, place, and manner" 
standard work in practice? Whenever a plaintiff asserts that the 
government is restricting a liberty interest,161 the burden shifts 
automatically to the government to prove anyone of the followin~: 
(1) the asserted interest is not a liberty interest (broadly defined); I 2 
(2) the restriction is not a substantial burdening of the liberty 
160. Ely, supra note 26, at 939 .. Then, if the results are unacceptable-if, for 
example, the Court consistently strikes down governmental actions that the 
people popularly support-the people have recourse in Article V to amend the 
Constitution to curtail the constitutional protections of LibertylFreedom. It 
would seem highly unlikely they would do so, however, since every amendment 
ever ratified (save one, the Eighteenth Amendment, which was undone by the 
Twenty-First Amendment a mere fourteen years later) has acted to broaden 
liberty. This trend is yet further proof that the core value for which the people 
believe the Constitution stands is LibertylFreedom. 
161. In cases not involving an asserted liberty interest, nothing would change 
-the presumption-of-constitutionality would still apply. See e.g., BARNETT, 
supra note 29, at 265 ("The many laws that regulate the internal operation of 
government agencies or the dispensation of government funds, for example, 
would be unaffected by a Presumption of Liberty."). 
162. See infra text accompanying notes 166-69 for discussion of the harm-
principle in defining liberty. See also BARNETT, supra note 29, at 262 
(suggesting that individual behavior causing sufficient harm is "wrongful" and 
thus regulatable as "license"; "Prohibiting such actions, though it restricts a 
person's freedom to do as he wills, does not violate the rights retained by the 
people. To the contrary, such prohibitions protect the liberty rights of others."). 
In meeting this stage one of the test, the government should be held to some 
kind of "proximate cause" standard, familiar from tort law. It is not simply 
enough for the government to assert some sort of broad, generalized harm. 
Specific harm to another must be shown. 
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interest; 163 or (3) it is a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction of the liberty interest. l64 .Failing proof of any of these 
three items, the government restriction is struck down. 165 
In applying stage one of the test, "liberty interests" is 
expansively defined. Justice Brandeis enunciated Liberty's proper 
scope in Olmstead v. United States: "The makers of our 
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness . . '. . They conferred, as against the 
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.,,16 John Stuart 
Mill's "harm principle" captures the essence of Liberty as 
protected under the new standard: 
[T]he only purpose for which [government] power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others .... 
The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is 
amenable to [government]/67 is that which concerns others. 
163. This element resembles the similar inquiry under the Court's current 
substantive due process approach, where "[t]he Supreme Court has said that in 
evaluating whether there is a violation of a [fundamental] right, it considers 
• [t ]he directness and substantiality of the interference. '" CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 42, at 819 (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,387 n.12 (1978». 
164. Strict scrutiny-not the time, place, and manner test-would apply if 
the restriction either: (1) involves a previously recognized (or as yet recognized) 
"fundamental right," see supra note 149; or (2) distinguishes among different 
individuals' exercise of the liberty interest, see supra note 146. See also supra 
note 117 (discussing "liberty-equality connection" expressed in Lawrence v. 
Texas). 
165. If the restriction consists of legislation, it can be struck down either as-
applied or on its face. See, e.g., Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 
U.S. 569, 580 (1998). 
166. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, 1. 
dissenting); see also FRIED, supra note 124, at 68-69 ("Imagine that each of us 
moves through life surrounded by a bubble ... [(]what we might call moral or 
liberty space) ... [and] [n]o one [including government] may trespass upon it 
without doing me wrong."). 
167. "Government" is substituted here for Mill's "society." For the purposes 
of this essay, it is only official legal action (or perhaps government-sanctioned 
social action) that gives rise to a constitutional violation. See also JED 
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 230 (2001) (arguing that Mill goes too far in 
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In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence 
is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign. 168 
57 
In short, as Brandeis and Mill suggest, government simply has 
no business intruding into an individual's Liberty/Freedom of 
Autonomy. 169 
Assuming we have both a liberty interest and a direct and 
substantial restriction, thus satisfying stages one and two, we then 
adding freedom from social coercion to freedom from legal coercion to create 
the formula for determining the "limit to the legitimate interference of collective 
opinion with individual independence" (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY 4 (1859), available at http://www.netlibrary.com.libezp.lib.lsu.eduJ 
SearchlAdvancedSearch.aspx (search "Title" "On Liberty" and "Author" "John 
Stuart Mill"; then follow "On Liberty" hyperlink»). 
168. MILL, supra note 167, at 52. Ian Shapiro writes, 
[T]hink of the harm principle as operating in two steps. When 
evaluating a particular action or policy, the first step involves deciding 
whether the action causes, or has the potential to cause, harm to others. 
If the answer is no, then the action is in the self-regarding realm and the 
government would be unjustified in interfering. Indeed, in that case the 
government has a duty to protect the individual's freedom of action 
against interference from others as well. If, however, the answer to the 
initial query is yes, then different considerations arise. We are then in a 
world in which harm is being committed willy-nilly, and the question 
is: What, if anything, should the government do about it? In this 
regard, a more accurate summation of the harm principle than the more 
famous formulation already quoted can be found at the start of chapter 
four: "As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially 
the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question 
whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering 
with it becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for 
entertaining any such discussion when a person's conduct affects the 
interests of no persons besides himself." 
IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORALITY OF POLITICS 60-61 (2003) (quoting MILL, supra 
note 167, at 60). 
169. See also generally Michael Anthony Lawrence, Reviving a Natural 
Right: The Freedom of Autonomy, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 123 (2006). If we 
stop and think about it, why should any person be allowed to impose his or her 
morality on others? For that matter, why do they want to? Anyone who wishes 
to impose his or her morality on others arguably is presumptively unfit to serve. 
As the old saying goes, the only people whom we should want to have the job of 
governing are those who do not want the job. 
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look to stage three and, assuming the restriction neither involves a 
previously recognized fundamental right nor distinguishes among 
persons seeking to exercise the liberty interest, in which case strict 
scrutiny would apply,170 inquire whether the government's limiting 
action is a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction. Under 
this inquiry, as the Court has often noted in the analogous First 
Amendment context, the restriction will be upheld only if it is 
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that [it] leave[s] of-en ample alternative channels for" exercise of 
the liberty interest. 71 
The impact of the new standard of review would be most 
dramatically felt in the many cases involving genuine (though 
currently unrecognized) liberty interests where the government 
restriction is currently presumed constitutional and upheld so long 
as it is rationally related to a legitimate purpose.172 For example, 
mere "conduct" that is presently excluded from protection under 
the Court's current First Amendment doctrine would now be 
entitled to protection so long as it constitutes a liberty interest as 
defined above; whereas, before, only conduct that is sufficiently 
communicative 173 would be entitled to protection.174 And once 
170. See supra note 158. 
171. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Perry 
Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See 
supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
172. Under the current presumption-of-constitutionality standard the 
challenger has the heavy burden of showing the government action is arbitrary 
or unreasonable. This burden would disappear under the new approach. 
173. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (emphasizing 
two factors in determining whether conduct is sufficiently expressive to qualify 
for First Amendment protection: (1) "An intent to convey a particularized 
message was present," and (2) "in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood 
was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it. "). 
174. Under current doctrine, once the activity is determined to be 
communicative conduct, the Court applies a form of intermediate scrutiny, 
where the government restriction is upheld only (1) "if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government;" (2) "if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest;" (3) "if the governmental interest is umelated 
to the suppression of free expression;" and (4) "if the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) 
(upholding conviction of individual who burned his draft card in violation of 
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again, by requiring heightened scrutiny for restrictions on all 
asserted liberty interests, we remove a degree of discretion from 
the judiciary, thus lessening concerns regarding the 
countermajoritarian difficulty. 175 
A fair application of the new standard would accordingly 
invalidate many current laws across the board, including, for 
example, many involving sex and drugs. We see, in applying the 
new test, that the government's criminalization of such matters of 
personal choice as engaging in prostitution and using marijuana 
violates individual liberty. The government is unable to meet its 
burden of showing any of the three criteria for either of these 
activities. First, deciding what to do with and put into one's own 
body is a liberty interest176-neither prostitutin~ oneself or using 
marijuana directly harms any other person. 77 Second, the 
government's criminalization of the activities of prostitution and 
marijuana use certainly impose substantial burdens on these liberty 
interests. Third, outright prohibitions on prostitution and 
marijuana use are not "reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions," for they do not allow any exercIse of the right. 
federal law). Where the government restriction of the conduct is related to 
suppression of free expression (number 3 above), the more demanding strict 
scrutiny is applied. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down 
conviction of individual who burned flag as a means of political protest, stating, 
"If the State's regulation is [related to expression], then we are outside 
O'Brien's test, and we must ask whether this interest justifies Johnson's 
conviction under a more demanding standard."). 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 155-59. 
176. The Court already recognizes elements of this liberty interest in its 
current substantive due process approach. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003) (finding liberty interest to engage in sexual activity of one's 
choosing in privacy of home); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990) (finding fundamental right to deny unwanted medical treatment); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding fundamental right of 
privacy to make personal sexuality-based decisions). All of these cases 
recognize the individual's most basic desire identified by Justice Brandeis-to 
be "let alone" from an overbearing government. 
177. Arguments that prostitution and marijuana use "harm society" are 
unavailing as failing to meet the proximate cause requirement. Any harm 
caused to others by the individual action is simply too remote. See supra note 
162 and text accompanying notes 166-69. 
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Accordingly, since the government is unable to meet its burden by 
demonstrating anyone of the three criteria, the criminalization of 
prostitution and marijuana use are unconstitutional. 
Regarding stage three of the new test, the "reasonable time, 
place, and manner" criterion, it is worth repeating that government 
may regulate prostitution and marijuana use, much like it regulates 
other professions like medicine and drugs like alcohol and 
cigarettes. The new proposed standard still gives adequate 
deference to the state to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare 
of the people under its police power. If the exercise of the asserted 
liberty interest truly directly harms another or others, it is not a 
protectable "liberty interest" under item one of the test because it 
violates the harm principle,178 and it may therefore be proscribed. 
Under item three, moreover, the government may exercise its 
police power by imposing reasonable time, place, and manner 
regulations-but not prohibitions--on the liberty interests, even as 
newly broadly defined. 179 
Government would be forced to fundamentally change its way 
of doing business under this essay's proposal. As American law 
and culture is built upon the edifice of decades of legislative 
supremacy met with the people's mostly silent- and passive 
acquiescence, this upheaval would no doubt encounter resistance 
from many quarters. 180 To the extent the new Liberty-First 
standard of review eliminates laws substantially burdening 
individual liberty interests and forces government to think more 
critically about the effects of its laws, serious progress will have 
been made in protecting Liberty and Freedom. 
178. See supra note 162 and text accompanying notes 16~9. 
179. See, e.g., BARNETI, supra note 29, at 262 ("[W]hen the rightful exercise 
of freedom involves more than one person, it can be 'regulated' or made regular 
to facilitate its exercise and, if necessary, to protect the rights of others. A 
regulation of liberty is not an improper infringement of liberty if a legal system 
merely says that, to obtain its protection, contracts or other transactions must 
take a certain form (if such a regulation is also found to be necessary)."). 
180. It goes without saying that the upheaval itself should be no reason to 
avoid the change. If a particular government practice unconstitutionally 
deprives a person of liberty, mere inconvenience or expense in abating the 
practice is an unacceptable excuse for failing to force the change. 
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N. CONCLUSION 
The approach proposed in this essay for a heightened scrutiny 
"reasonable time, place, and manner" judicial standard of review 
for all government restrictions burdening individual liberty 
interests may seem radical-and it probably is radical, when 
viewed in the context of current judicial practice. No doubt such a 
change would create an uproar among lawyers, academics, 
legislators, lobbyists, administrators, jurists, and others vested in 
the status quo. But that would be a good thing. If we take a deep 
breath, remove the blinders, raise our heads and see with fresh eyes 
the great vistas of possibility for furthering freedom, we may well 
surprise ourselves and conclude that a progressive liberty approach 
is more faithful to the core principles upon which America was 
founded as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and 
guaranteed in the Constitution. 
Quixotic? Maybe. But then again, maybe not. As discussed, 
the suggestion does have the practical advantage of being "doable" 
within the Court's current analytical imagination. In any event, 
every movement starts with conversation,181 and with every new 
exchange reminding us of our Liberty-based birthright, we make 
positive progress in our "own search for greater freedom.,,182 
181. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 26, at 720-21: 
Legal culture has an important place for ... "off-the-wall" arguments. 
They are a form of prophecy. They dare others to think differently 
about settled questions in a constitutional regime. They try to unsettle 
what seems fixed and certain. Even if today a particular position seems 
extreme, the position asserts that it is the true meaning of the 
Constitution that will come to be recognized in time .... Members of 
social movements with "off-the-wall" arguments have an effect .... 
They make claims about the Constitution and start a conversation. 
Only the future knows whether the unconventional position, or parts of 
it, will become accepted. Much turns on whether social movements 
and political parties get behind a particular interpretation of the 
Constitution and use their power to push it into public acceptance. 
182. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
HeinOnline -- 68 La. L. Rev. 62 2007-2008
